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ABSTRACT
Research science intellectual property law has undergone
tremendous change within the past two decades.1 In particular,
* Joan Jackson has a J.D. from the University of MassachusettsDartmouth School of Law; B.S. and M.S. in Biology from Tulane University;
and Ph.D. in Zoology from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. She spent
twenty-seven years as a senior research scientist/laboratory director/program
manager/inventor, identifying new drugs and diagnostics for orphan diseases,
and designing- and conducting preclinical new drug efficacy studies; twenty
years as Deputy Tropical Medicine Course Director/Adjunct faculty, teaching
M.D., and medical students. Acknowledgments: This Article would not exist
but for years of kind mentorship and patient correction of numerous drafts by
Ralph D. Clifford, Esq., Professor of Law and Former Associate Dean,
University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth School of Law; and Frances Howell
Rudko, Esq., Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth
School of Law. Any mistakes or errors are to be solely attributed to the
Author. Contact: Joan E. Jackson, email: researchsciencelaw@aol.com; cell:
301-661-9002; or joanjacksonlaw.com. The phrase, “Beyond the Scope of
Ordinary Training and Knowledge,” borrowed from 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006),
refers herein to novel research science achievement, arguably qualifying its
natural creator for moral rights under international standards.
1. “Research science” and “scientific research” are used interchangeably.
“Science” is defined herein broadly to include traditional laboratory sciences
and social sciences. “Research” has been defined by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) as:
A systematic, intensive study intended to increase
knowledge or understanding of the subject studied, a
systematic study specifically directed toward applying new
knowledge to meet a recognized need, or a systematic
application of knowledge to the production of useful
materials, devices, and systems or methods, including
design, development, and improvement of prototypes and
new processes to meet specific requirements.
Glossary & Acronym List, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES,
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/glossary.htm#S (last visited July 14, 2012).
David L. Faigman et al. distinguished “applied research” from “basic
research” as follows:
“Basic research” is performed in order to provide a
theoretical understanding of a phenomenon of interest. . . .
[I]n science [a theory] means an explanation for a set of
observed facts. Theory is not contrary to fact, it is the
abstract or conceptual account [composed of hypotheses] for
why the observed facts exist as they do. These [conceptual
explanations] may or may not lead to a practical
application. The steps in the process of theory development
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research science procedure and focus has shifted dramatically

and testing – hypothetico-deductive research [include] . . . .
1. Observations of some phenomenon are made. . . .
2. Possible explanations [theories] are proposed for what is
observed. . . .
3. Hypotheses [conceptual propositions] are logically derived
from the theories.
4. Studies are designed to test [the validity] of the
hypotheses. In essence, the [research] study makes news
observations that might disconfirm the hypothesis and
thereby falsify the theory.
5. The results of such empirical tests lead to the revision or
abandonment of older theories or the creation of still newer
and hopefully better [more accurate] theories.
6. The process repeats itself as more empirical tests are
conducted and theories undergo continued re-evaluation.
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND
RESEARCH ISSUES 120-21 (2002). “‘Applied research’ is aimed at answering
immediate, practical questions. . . . Some [applied] research [e.g., a research
survey] is conducted to provide a thorough description of something,” to “try
to explain patterns or similarity and variation that had been found.” Id. at
120. To be disclosed or published, most research science must be subject to
peer review. The NIH defines “peer review” as:
The process that involves the consistent application of
standards and procedures that produce fair, equitable, and
objective examinations of [research funding] applications
[and research findings submitted for publication or
disclosure] based on an evaluation of scientific or technical
merit or other relevant aspects of the application [or
research manuscript submitted for publication]. The review
is performed by experts (Peer Reviewers) in the field of
endeavor for which support [or professional journal
publication] is requested. Peer review is intended to provide
guidance and recommendations [e.g. commentary on
research to prospective research scientist authors] . . . .
NIH Grants Policy Statement, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES,
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2011/nihgps_ch1.htm#definitions_o
f_terms (last visited July 14, 2012); see also Peter W. B. Phillips & Camille D.
Ryan, The Role of Clusters in Driving Innovation, in 1 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST
PRACTICES 281, 281-94 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2006). See generally AM.
LAW INST., Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES 3-7, §§ 101-103 (2008) [hereinafter ALI] (ALI’s
model principles regarding current global intellectual property law and law
practice).
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from local to global.2 Historically, prior to Internet
communication, science generally focused on solutions to
problems impacting local, regional, or national populations.3
The scientific research (and, hence, the law governing
intellectual property) similarly was largely circumscribed
within the nation-state: professional research societies (science
quality and ethics), state law (contractual and licensing
agreements enforcement), and federal law governing copyright
and patent.4
With the twenty-first century reliance on Internet
communications, there was a marked shift in focus from local
research science to global research science.5 The Internet
opportunities to draw from worldwide scientific talent and
diverse expertise in real-time became an irresistible siren’s
song for research scientists to address global problems that
only a few years ago were deemed unsolvable.6 Today, the
typical modern research laboratory is virtual, via the Internet,
and composed of all existing international scientific expertise
considered necessary to tackle major problems facing world
populations.7 Both undergraduate science education8 and
2. Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1, at 281-94; see also COMM. ON NEW
GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP FOR SCI. AND SEC., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND
SECURITY IN A POST 9/11 WORLD: A REPORT BASED ON REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SECURITY COMMUNITIES 61 (2007) [hereinafter NEW
GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP] (“[L]ife sciences research is now nearly borderless and is
a global collaborative activity.”); ALI, supra note 1, at 6 (“The internationalist
perspective also requires the Principles to envision a future in which
coordination among [nation states’] courts evolves from the exceptional to the
expected.”).
3. See generally Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1, at 281-94.
4. See ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103.
5. Teri Melese, Building and Managing Corporate Alliances in an
Academic Medical Center, 15 RES. MGMT. REV., Winter/Spring 2006, at 17,
available
at
http://www.ncura.edu/content/news/rmr/docs/v15n1.pdf
(“Moreover, there is an increased desire for companies to engage in strategic
research partnerships reflecting a general trend for companies to move away
from licensing arrangements and toward building partnerships.”).
6. See ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103.
7. See Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1, at 281-94; Melese, supra note 5, at
14:
The practice of biomedical research is changing. It is
evolving towards a bigger enterprise involving multiple
investigators from multiple institutions, both academic and
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university education are also embracing the virtual
international laboratory research model.9 The result is that
research science intellectual property law is struggling to keep
corporate. No single investigator can assemble all the
required technologies and expertise to understand complex
disease mechanisms and to translate that scientific
knowledge into disease treatment. To move discoveries
effectively between bench and bedside requires close ties
among
the
basic
[academic
fundamental
biological/biochemical
processes],
clinical
[patient
management], and corporate research enterprises.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7 (illustrating
that ALI recognized that modern global commerce strains existing global
intellectual property (IP) regulation because existing IP regulation lacks fully
harmonized international legal standards).
8. Stephen K. Ritter, Reengineering the Undergraduate Laboratory,
CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Sept. 19, 2011, at 34-35. Students at
Boston-based Simmons College conduct hands-on basic polymer research in
collaboration with other institutions, including one university in Argentina.
Id.
9. See generally UK/US STUDY GROUP, HIGHER EDUCATION AND
COLLABORATION IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, BUILDING A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, A
PRIVATE REPORT TO PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN 15, 20 (2009), available
at www.aau.edu/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=9222. This Study Group
stated:

Political systems – which remain resolutely national – have a
notoriously hard time effectively addressing the world’s
greatest problems, which are transnational and global in
nature. . . . [University-to-University] [t]ransnational HE
[higher education] collaboration can elude the roadblocks that
make it difficult to effectively address big global problems. . .
. [O]ne possible vehicle is multilateral and multi-member
collaborations. Universities must leverage their longevity and
stability, and their ability to forge international bonds to create
entities that have as their explicit mandate to take on the longterm, multilateral study of the most threatening global issues. .
. . Increasingly, universities are relied upon for a huge range of
research activities that used to be shared or shouldered by the
private sector. “Blue sky” research – research undertaken for
knowledge’s sake, to probe theoretical boundaries but without
immediate applied value – is the driver of innovation. . . .
[W]hile we may know what today’s “marketable areas” are,
we don’t know those of tomorrow – and only open ended
research leads there. Now the locus of innovative research is,
and will increasingly be, the university.
Id. (emphasis added).

7

JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES

2012]

11/13/2012 9:03 AM

“BEYOND THE SCOPE”

683

abreast of the intertwined research science global network
relationships.10 National intellectual property law is being
rapidly subsumed within global intellectual property law,
simply because the research science parties involved even in
unitary research projects span the globe.11
Global research proceeds logically into global commerce
and both exert tremendous leverage on nations to conform to
international intellectual property norms.12 Absent the United
States’ consensus to be bound by majority global intellectual
property agreements and regulatory authority, U.S. scientists
face material disadvantages in modern global scientific
research.13
I.

Introduction

Moral rights’ significance may perhaps be summed from an
ancient truism: writers write, composers compose, painters
paint, inventors invent, and so on, so that more often than not
what one considers important in life is reflected in how one
spends his life.14 Moral rights evolved over centuries to grant
recognition under law of the intangible essence of one’s person
inexorably reflected in one’s creative tangible work product(s).15
This Article focuses on research scientists’ moral rights:
first, what these are and why formal recognition is essential to
scientists’ production of research benefiting the public, to the
integrity of the scientific endeavor, and to sustain the research
10. See Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1, at 281-94; Melese, supra note 5, at
13, 14. See generally ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103.
11. See generally ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103.
12. Id. at 4-7.
13. Id. at 3-7, §§ 101-103; see also Jason Koebler, Demand, Pay for
STEM Skills Skyrocket, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 20, 2011,
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/stem-education/2011/10/20/stemcompetency-a-foundational-skill-jobs-expert-says. “[T]here’s a problem with
‘attracting homegrown American talent to science and engineering in the face
of increasing supplies of highly qualified students and workers from lowerwage countries.’” Id. “For every 100 students who graduates with a bachelor’s
degree, 19 graduate with a degree in STEM, but only eight are working in a
STEM occupation 10 years down the line . . . .” Id.
14. GOD’S LITTLE DEVOTIONAL BIBLE 1111 (1997).
15. See generally GILLIAN DAVIES & KEVIN GARNETT, MORAL RIGHTS 3-64
(2010).
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science profession in the United States. Specifically germane to
intellectual rights control and government rights in research
science are the impact of post-9/11 federal security measures,16
the 2011 Supreme Court decision in Stanford University v.
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.17 regarding the Bayh-Dole and
Stevenson-Wydler Acts,18 and federal action to curb “science
misconduct.”19 Second, the Article will address the current
status of moral rights recognition in law in the United States;
in other words, why the lack of U.S. moral rights for research
scientists presages material disadvantage to U.S. scientists
conducting research in modern global virtual laboratories.
Third, United States moral rights legal recognition for research
science is proposed, i.e., recognition and enforcement in federal
law by non-waivable assignment to scientists of non-economic
moral rights: attribution, integrity, retraction and disclosure.
The latter moral rights are essential to research scientists’
careers, to research science quality, and to ensure public
disclosure. Moral rights are distinct from potentially alienable
economic rights, allegedly important to research scientists’
employers and government.

16. See also Research Compliance: A Faculty Handbook, Research
Security
in
the
Post-9/11
Environment,
UC
BERKLEY,
http://rac.berkeley.edu/compliancebook/post911.html (last visited June 10,
2012); Allison Chamberlain, Science and Security in the Post-9/11
Environment, Export Controls: Grants, Contracts, and Publishing, AM. ASS’N
FOR
THE
ADVANCEMENT
OF
SCI.,
available
at
http://www.aaas.org/spp/post911/grants/ (last visited June 10, 2012). See
generally NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2.
17. Bd. of Trs. Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys.,
Inc., 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
18. University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 (BayhDoyle Act of 1980), Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§
200-212 (2006)) (controls allocation of rights to inventions made by employees
of small business firms and domestic nonprofit organizations, including
universities, in federally assisted programs); Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (2006)) (“[T]he Federal Government shall
strive where appropriate to transfer owned and originated technology to
State and local governments and to the private sector.”).
19. See generally DHHS Policies on Research Misconduct, 42 C.F.R. pts.
50, 93 (2011) (effective June 16, 2005).
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II. Problem: Ostensibly to Promote Economic Enterprise, U.S.
Law Is Failing to Preserve the Link Between the
Scientist and His/Her Investigative Findings and
Discoveries
A. Why Research Scientists’ Professional Activities Directly
Depend on Recognition of Moral Rights
A scientist’s professional activities directly depend on the
recognition of moral rights because these rights are essential to
ensure science validity20 (including transition into the
marketplace for public benefit); to the integrity of the research
process and profession; to prompt public research disclosure;
and, to sustain the individual research scientist’s career.21
Research paternity (or right of attribution of the actual creator
to be identified with his own work, contra plagiarism),22
20. Valid science is considered synonymous with reproducible results,
using the exact materials and methods initially reported. Results
reproduction requires precise, complete disclosure to research peers
(scientific peer review), capable of replicating the innovative discovery to
evaluate scientific validity in fact.
21. Sean B. Seymour, How Does My Work Become Our Work? Dilution of
Authorship in Scientific Papers, and the Need for the Academy to Obey
Copyright Law, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. (ISSUE 3, ARTICLE 11) 1, 2-3 (2006); see
also Mark L. Meyer, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Protection of and Rights in Scientific Research, 39 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 1, 33-34
(1998). See generally COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, AND PUB. POLICY, RISING ABOVE
THE GATHERING STORM: ENERGIZING AND EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER
ECONOMIC FUTURE 70, 83-84, 104-105, 186-192 (2007) [hereinafter GATHERING
STORM]; MEMBERS OF THE 2005 “RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM” COMM.,
RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM, REVISITED: RAPIDLY APPROACHING
CATEGORY 5 (2010) [hereinafter STORM REVISITED].
22. David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Plagiarism (Without A
Moral Right Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 67 (2004)
(quoting the Modern Language Association’s four-prong definition of
plagiarism). The definition is as follows:
Plagiarism is the use of another person’s ideas or
expressions in your writing without acknowledging the
source.
Simply put, plagiarism is using another person’s words or
ideas without appropriate acknowledgement.
In short, to plagiarize is to give the impression that you
have written or thought something that you have in fact
borrowed from someone else.
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research integrity (or right of respect, right to object to
distortion, mutilation or unauthorized modification of his
work), right of retraction (right to withdraw the work from
circulation and public use based on, for example, later specific
contrary findings),23 and right of disclosure (right to control
first publication of the work) control research science in fact.24
The right to divulge and retract allows the author to decide

IV.[P]lagiarism is:
a. reproducing someone else’s sentences more or less
verbatim, and presenting them as your own;
b. repeating another’s particularly apt phrase;
c. paraphrasing someone else’s argument;
d. introducing another’s line of thinking;
e. failing to cite the source for a borrowed thesis.
Id.; see also K. R. ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 39, 54
(1988) (“academic plagiarism is a capital offense, punishable by academic
death for student or faculty. With or without warnings.”); Lisa G. Lerman,
Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and
Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 475 (2001); Jaime S. Dursht, Judicial
Plagiarism: It May Be Fair But Is It Ethical?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1253, 1260
(1996).
23. See, e.g., Steve Ritter, Metal-Oxo Papers Retracted, CHEMICAL AND
ENGINEERING NEWS, June 18, 2012, at 9 (Although the data published were
correct, the authors retracted because later experiments proved their earlier
interpretation of the data was wrong); Robert H. Silverman, et al., Letter:
Partial Retraction, 334 SCI. 176, 176 (2011) (published Oct. 14, 2011).
24. DAVIES & GARNETT, supra note 15, at 5-6. Moral rights are:
[G]enerally understood as the rights accorded the author of
a work and related to the personality of the author, and the
integrity of the author and the work, as opposed to the
economic rights; the main moral rights are those of
divulgation (right to disclose the work), paternity (right to
be identified as the author of the work), integrity (right to
maintain the integrity of the author in relation to the work,
and the integrity of the work itself), and right of retraction
(right to retract the work from circulation when the author
changes views). Only the paternity and integrity rights are
recognized in the Berne Convention: civil law jurisdictions
may recognize the four rights, but common law jurisdictions
[e.g. U.K. and U.S.A.] tend to limit recognition to the rights
of paternity and integrity, as required by the Convention.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also SIGMA XI, THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SOC’Y,
HONOR IN SCIENCE 39 (2000); SIGMA XI, THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SOC’Y, THE
RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER: PATHS AND PITFALLS 22 (1999).
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when, where, and in what form the work will be disclosed (this
is often equated with right of first publication).25 Moral rights
are distinct from and legally distinguishable from economic
rights in the intellectual products of research science.26
Albeit an over-simplification, it has been said that the
common law countries (e.g. U.S. and U.K.) are more concerned
with protection of economic rights, whereas civil law countries
concentrate on the moral rights of the creators, authors, and
artists.27 Also, it was argued that moral rights in common law
countries were superfluous, being protected by federal, state, or
common law (e.g. unfair competition, contract, defamation, and
privacy).28 The United States currently restricts moral rights
25. GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 90-91 (2008).
26. “Economic rights” is a
term generally used to describe rights related to the
economic exploitation of protected material, as distinct from
moral rights. The main economic rights are those of
reproduction (copying), adaptation, communication and
distribution. In French law, the economic rights are referred
to as “patrimonial rights”. [sic] Economic rights are usually
established separately from moral rights in those laws
which recognise both species of protection.
J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW, PROTECTION OF AUTHORS’ WORKS,
PERFORMANCES, PHONOGRAMS, FILMS, VIDEO, BROADCASTS AND PUBLISHED
EDITIONS IN NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAW 1225 (3d ed. 2008)
(emphasis in original).
27. 1 DAVID T. KEELING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EU LAW,
FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION LAW 263 (2003); see also Gilliam v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American copyright law, as
presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action
for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than
the personal, rights of authors.”).
28. STERLING, supra note 26, at 408; see also Nimmer, supra note 22, at
16-24 (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.12[A] (2004)):
The Berne Implementation Act of 1988 expressly states that
U.S. law then in existence sufficed to comport with all the
requirements of the Berne Convention. Article 6bis [moral
rights] was foremost on Congress’s mind in that regard-fully
a third of the enactments thirteen sections are designed to
forestall a claim that Berne adherence creates a direct cause
of action under U.S. law for the enforcement of moral rights.
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recognition and enforcement to visual arts, performance and
broadcasting professionals, and certain software creators.29 In
the U.S., research scientists’ discoveries and disclosures are
currently accorded no moral rights legal protection comparable
to artistic creations.30

Id.
29. GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT
2002):

IN THE

PUBLIC INTEREST 88-89 (2d ed.

The Berne Convention implementation Act of 1988 paved
the way for U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention on
March 1, 1989, an “epochal event” bringing the United
States of America into the major multilateral copyright
Convention. Moral rights, which had never gained statutory
recognition in the United States of America but which
Member States of the Berne Convention are bound to
respect, were stated to be provided for “under the
confirmation of a great many common law precedents,
several state statutes, and federal laws.” In 1990, however,
Congress enacted the Visual Artists’ Rights Act, which
affords limited rights of attribution and integrity to a
narrowly defined class of visual artists with respect to
certain artistic works and photographs. In the same year,
the Computer Software Rental Agreements Act was
adopted, granting authors or producers of software the right
to authorize or prohibit rental of copies, even after sale.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
30. ROBERTA R. KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY, FORGING A MORAL
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 37 (2010).
As the close of the First decade of the twenty-first century,
the United States appears to be rather isolated in its failure
to recognize explicitly adequate moral rights. The existence
of more substantive moral rights protections in both civil
and common law jurisdictions not only creates a disparity
between law in the United States and many other countries,
but also results in the situation in which American authors
find substantially more protection for violations of their
moral rights abroad than at home.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Cyrill P. Rigamonte, Deconstructing
Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 353, 354 (2006) (“the adoption of civil-lawstyle moral rights legislation is a major shift in terms of copyright theory,
because it eliminates the key features that distinguished common law from
civil law copyright systems”); Nimmer, supra note 22, at 19-20 (raising the
question whether countries like England “have augmented their moral rights
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David Nimmer, copyright authority, recognized that the
right of attribution, with preclusion of its negative (plagiarism
or reverse passing off), is essential to academic research:
[T]here remains one locale where the prohibition
on reverse passing off [in research science:
plagiarism, fraud, and misrepresentation] serves
an essential role, which could legitimately arise to
affect the legal rights of those caught within its
net. That legal domain is academe, with
particular emphasis on the customs of higher
education. . . . “Ideas, research, and writing are
the currency of academe. Originality of written
work is essential to the integrity of the academic
system. A professor who claims the work or
another as his own-even if it is part of an articleis engaged in academic fraud.”31
In the U.S., research science intellectual property
ownership may affect both attribution and control, to include
what is disclosed (integrity) and whether research findings are
disclosed to the public or not.32 Employers, including certain
federal agencies, want monopoly control over the products of
their employees’ intellectual property, and a variety of legal
doctrines, agencies’ policies and practices allow them to get it.33
protection” since the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1988 “in a
way that leaves the United States isolated.”)
31. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 66, 74 n.437 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
32. See Seymour, supra note 21, at 11 (“Publication is the key to
recognition, success, and advancement in science. Thus, every publication
decision is necessarily decisive.”). See generally Roberta R. Kwall, The
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between
Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 985 (2002). The
underlying theme of this article is that because the United States’ copyright
law and section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act (codified at 15 U.S.C.
1125(a)) are grounded in objectives other than the personality and nonmonetary interests with which the right of attribution is concerned, the
federal enactment of a right of attribution applicable to a broad category of
copyrightable works is vital. See id.
33. Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of
Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127,
1128 (1998).
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In particular, the law governing ownership or control of
copyright and patents often results in employer intellectual
property ownership (and thus control).34 Fisk aptly
summarized:
The modern law was forged in the crucible where
patent law’s egalitarianism collided with the
hierarchical premises of the law of master and
servant. The law of employee inventions is an
unstable mixture of the two bodies of law, the
former honoring the rights of the inventor as
employee and the latter being skeptical of the
rights of the employee as inventor. . . . As
Abraham Lincoln famously observed, “In
anciently inhabited countries, the dust of the
ages—a real downright old-foggyism—seems to
settle upon, and smother intellects and energies
of man.” But in America, he asserted, we had
broken the “shackles” of the “slavery of mind”
and had established “a habit of freedom of
thought” that was necessary to the “discovery
and production of new and useful things.” The
patent law nourished this habit of free thought
by allowing the ingenious to profit; it added “the
fuel of interest to the fire of genius.”35
The current United States deference to “hierarchical
premises of the law of master and servant,” coupled with denial
of recognition for mere non-economic moral rights to
attribution, integrity, retraction, and disclosure, essential to
research scientists’ careers and necessary to ensure research
science quality, places U.S. research science in jeopardy in the
modern global laboratories.36
34. Id. at 1128; see Allison Chamberlain, Science and Security in the
Post-9/11 Environment Export Controls: Grants, Contracts and Publishing,
AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/spp/post911/grants/ (last visited July 14, 2012).
35. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1128-29.
36. Id. at 1128; see, e.g., GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 104-05:
[S]ome measures put in place in the wake of September 11,
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B. Public Benefit Flowed from Personal Ownership of
Intellectual Property
1.

Why Does It Matter Who Owns and Controls
ScientificResearch?

In Weinstein v. University of Illinois, Judge Easterbrook
summarized historic intellectual property ownership and
control for research scientists:
The University concedes in this court that a
professor of mathematics who proves a new
theorem in the course of his employment will
own the copyright to his article containing that
proof. This has been the academic tradition since
copyright law began . . . a tradition the
2001, seeking to increase homeland security, will be
ineffective at best and could in fact hamper US economic
competitiveness and prosperity. . . . Of principal concern
now are other forms of disincentive: expansion of the
restrictions on “deemed exports,” . . . . Expanded or new
categories of “sensitive but unclassified” information [both]
could restrict publication or other forms of dissemination. . .
. Both approaches could undermine the protections for
fundamental research established in National Security
Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), the Reagan
Administration’s 1985 executive order declaring that
publicly funded research . . . be unrestricted. . . . The NSDD189 policy remains in force and has been reaffirmed by
senior officials of the [then] current [George W. Bush]
administration, but it appears to be at odds with other
policy developments and some recent practices.
Id.; see, e.g., Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for
Nat’l Sec. Affairs, to Dr. Harold Brown, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies
(Nov. 1, 2001), in COMM’N ON SCI. AND SEC., SCIENCE AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 111 (2002) 111 (reaffirming the NSDD-189); John Marburger, Dir.,
Office of Sci. and Tech. Policy, Remarks at the Roundtable on Scientific
Communication and National Security (June 19, 2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2003/06/ostp061903.html. See also Philip H.
Hulme, Biosecurity and the Politics of Fear, 334 SCI. 176, 177 (Oct. 14, 2011)
(“Since the 2011 anthrax mailings shocked the public, the United States has
substantially increased its funding for research and development of
biodefense countermeasures. . . . These funds could be better spent.
Biodefense research focuses on pathogens of high biodefense value but low
public health significance.”).
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University’s policy purports to retain. The
tradition covers scholarly articles and other
intellectual property . . . .37
As Judge Easterbrook aptly noted, historically there exist
numerous examples of United States scientists who built
successful professional research careers making monumental
health and economic contributions as envisioned by the
constitutional framers. More often than not, scientists are
professionally enabled because of unchallenged ownership and
control of their own creative research intellectual property.
Scientists’ careers, including mobility and the freedom to
change employment,38 are established on research science
disclosure. There is no logical incentive for any scientist to
refuse to disclose his research discoveries. Ownership by
scientist creators historically fulfilled the constitutional
purpose of Art. I, Sec. 8: “To promote the progress of science
and the useful arts.” Representative examples of countless
similar scientist creators include: from industry, Thomas A.
Edison; from academia, George Washington Carver; and from
medicine, Thomas E. Starzl, each promoting “progress of
science.”
An early industrial research scientist, Thomas Alva
Edison, held over 1093 patents as actual inventor-creator.39
Edison was born February 11, 1847 and died October 18,
1931.40 Edison sold his initial patents, which he created as a
37. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987); see
also Seymour, supra note 21, at 5 (“[I]t has been the prevailing academic
practice to treat the faculty member as the copyright owner of the works that
are created independently and at the faculty members own initiative for
traditional academic purposes.”) (quoting AAUP, STATEMENT ON COPYRIGHT
(1999)); Seymour, supra note 21, at 5 (“Because professors choose the subject
matter, intellectual approach, and direction of their scholarship, the
university exerts little to no control and thus is not entitled to ownership.”)
(citing Sunil R. Kulkarni, All Professors Create Equally: Why Faculty Should
Have Complete Control Over the Intellectual Property Rights in Their
Creations, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 240 (1995)).
38. NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 3 (“The global scientific
enterprise thrives on the movement of students and scholars across borders
and among institutions.”).
39. Edison’s Patents, RUTGERS U., http://edison.rutgers.edu/patents.htm
(last updated Feb. 20, 2012).
40. Detailed Biography, RUTGERS U., http://edison.rutgers.edu/bio-
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telegrapher, using money from the sales to eventually set up
his own research and development laboratory in Menlo Park,
New Jersey.41 In Menlo Park, Edison led a team of inventors,
numbering over 10,000 during the first World War, credited
with hundreds of inventions associated with bringing
electricity to the U.S. public via his company, General
Electric.42 Edison’s modest goals still mirror those of a majority
of today’s research scientists: “Having one’s own shop
[laboratory], working on projects of one’s own choosing, making
enough money today so one could do the same tomorrow . . . .”43
George Washington Carver was an academic, inventor,
botanist, and fast friend of Thomas Edison.44 Professor Carver
was born on July 12, 1864 and died on January 5, 1943. 45 The
son of a Missouri slave, Carver attended Iowa State University,
earning a bachelor’s degree in 1894 and a master’s degree in
1896. 46 He then joined the faculty of Booker T. Washington
University’s Tuskegee Institute.47
Carver viewed the scientist as a person who “unlocked the
mysteries of the universe in order to improve the quality of life
for everyone, particularly the poor and underprivileged.”48
Through the years, Professor Carver gained international
stature, working with scientists from China, Japan, Russia,
India, Europe, and South America. In 1916, he was elected a
member of the Royal Society for the Encouragement of the Arts
in England.49 Carver also consulted with the U.S. War
long.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2012).
41. RANDALL STROSS, THE WIZARD OF MENLO PARK: HOW THOMAS ALVA
EDISON INVENTED THE MODERN WORLD 20-21 (2007).
42. The Making of Modern America: The Wizard of Menlo Park, DIGITAL
HIST.,
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HHID=339
(last updated July 14, 2012); HOWARD B. ROCKMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW FOR ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS 129-134 (2004).
43. STROSS, supra note 41, at 13.
44. GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER, IN HIS OWN WORDS xiii-xiv, 7, 11
(Gary R. Kremer ed. 1987).
45. Id. at xiii-xiv.
46. Id. at xiii, 6, 24, 45, 46, 50, 84, 112, 129.
47. Id. at 47.
48. Id. at 102.
49. See Dr. Carver is Dead; Negro Scientist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1943,
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0712.html.
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Department.50 Having developed about 100 commercial
products from the sweet potato and over 145 products from the
peanut, Professor Carver argued southern U.S. poverty could
be eliminated by agricultural products diversification: peanuts,
pecans, and sweet potatoes as cash crop replacements for
cotton.51 Professor Carver published his science research in a
series of 50 bulletins. Upon his death, he established the
George Washington Carver Foundation at Tuskegee Institute
to perpetuate research in agriculture and chemistry.52
Thomas Starzl, the medical father of liver transplant
surgery, was born in 1926.53 Dr. Starzl, spent his life from
1947-1959 in college, medical school, surgical residencies and
surgical fellowship programs.54 He began his research career by
developing a method to track and record deep brain responses
to sensory stimuli, earning a Ph.D. in neurophysiology at the
same time he received his medical degree with distinction in
1952.55 Starzl continued surgical training at Johns Hopkins
University Hospital in Baltimore for four years. Thereafter,
Starzl continued surgical training in open-heart surgery and
blood vessel surgery at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami,
work that later proved critical to liver transplantation. While
in Miami, he set up a research laboratory in his garage and
experimented with transplanting the livers of dogs.56
In 1958, Dr. Starzl moved to Northwestern University,
passed the thoracic surgery boards (1959), and was awarded
two research grants, one from the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) and one, a Markle Scholarship, which together allowed
him to resume research on liver transplants for four years.57
Starzl subsequently relocated to the Colorado School of
Medicine, where he performed more than 1,000 kidney
transplants and improved post-operative therapies to control
non-twin organ rejection, using combinations of irradiation,
50.
51.
52.
53.

CARVER, supra note 44, at 102.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 102-126, 148-170.
THOMAS E. STARZL, THE PUZZLE PEOPLE: MEMOIRS
SURGEON 6 (1992).
54. Id. at 25-69.
55. Id. at 37-46.
56. Id. at 47.
57. Id. at 62-69.

OF A
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immunosuppressant drugs, and the synthetic corticosteroid
suppressant, prednisone.58
Starzl’s primary interest was liver transplantation, which
due to the dual problems of uncontrolled bleeding and organ
rejection, presented more difficult surgical problems than
kidney transplantation. He returned to liver transplantation
surgery in March and May of 1963, and both patients died.59
Over the years, Starzl was able to gradually increase postoperative survival of his liver transplant patients, patients who
were already terminal due to their own liver’s failure.60
Although Starzl tried alternative approaches to counter postoperative rejection, his ultimate success would lie in his
identification of new anti-rejection therapies, anti-lymphocyte
globulin and the immunosuppressants, cyclosporine and
tacrolimus, the solutions making liver transplantation a
“standard procedure” today.61 Starzl summed up his career by
stating, “[p]eople who have an intellectual objective dream large
and build castles.”62 “[O]ur mutual goal, and especially mine,
was to bring liver transplantation to clinical use.”63
Furthermore, “[d]uring those years. . .the [transplant] surgeons
and physicians also changed-not so rapidly because their lives
were not at stake, but inexorably, because the lives of others
were in their hands. Some were corroded or destroyed by the
experience, some were sublimated, and none remained the
same.”64 Starzl continues to speak throughout the world and
has published four books, 2130 scientific articles, and 292 book
chapters.65
The key takeaway from these representative research
scientists is that the overwhelming majority did not elect
research science as a profession having any reasonable vision
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 83-95.
Id. at 96-117.
See id. at 243-333.
Id.
Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 4.
See Alum Thomas Starzl to Receive National Medal of Science, NW.
U. FEINBERG SCH. MED.,
http://www.feinberg.northwestern.edu/news/2005/2005ADecember/starzl.html (last visited July 10, 2012).
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of tremendous wealth. Scientists do elect scientific research
because of elusive scientific answers or heretofore “unsolvable”
problems that often become personal professional quests,
personal passion and require personal dedication unrelated to
and beyond any economic return but subsistence to continue
the work. Best practices of scientific research reflect these
latter principles.66
66. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY, COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC COMMC’N
AND NAT’L SEC. DEV., SEC., & COOPERATION POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS, BEYOND
“FORTRESS AMERICA”: NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 47-48 (2009):
Best Practices that Enable Success in Fundamental
Research [include:] . . .
Freedom in inquiry. . . . [S]cientists are generally free to
pursue any question that is of interest. It is often visionary
scientific teams that discover paradigm-shifting advances
leading to whole new fields of inquiry.
Freedom to pursue knowledge at the scientist’s own
discretion. Many scientists are interested in unraveling the
mysteries of the natural and physical worlds without regard
to practical application. Others pursue opportunities driven
by technological shifts, but without a defined end goal. Yet
others choose to tackle and solve problems that confront
mankind . . . opportunity driven research, often leads to
products and processes of great significance . . . in ways that
were never anticipated by those conducting the initial
research. . . .
Freedom to collaborate without limitation. Open
communication among scientists can provide insights into
problems and their solutions . . . . Rapid advances often
occur at the interface between fields or from the application
of advances in one field to a related field. . . .
Pluralistic and meritocratic support of science. . . . Science . .
. not guided by a master plan that constrains scientific
activity to defined avenues. . . . Similarly, most scientific
research funding is administered under a meritocratic
review system designed to support the best researchers who
propose the best ideas.
Freedom to publish. Science is a cumulative subject in which
each scientist builds on the work of others. The fundamental
error-correction mechanism of science arises from the
replication of work that has been conducted by others, thus
enabling mistakes to be exposed. This approach depends on
the wide dissemination and open communication of
scientific results and methods.
Id. (emphasis in original).

21

JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES

2012]

11/13/2012 9:03 AM

“BEYOND THE SCOPE”

697

However, as illustrated in the three examples, each
scientist at every stage of the research required intellectual
property ownership and control for his research continuation to
the next improvement and, finally, to successful achievement.
Had the telegraph companies claimed Edison’s initial patents;
had the University claimed Carver’s publications’ copyrights or
censored or denied publication disclosure by him; had the
various hospitals and university medical facilities claimed
Starzl’s preliminary surgical advances denying basic moral
right, respectively, would the U.S. electricity network,
Southern poverty alleviation by crop rotation and new product
derivatives marketing, or the surgical procedure and drugprotocols essential to liver transplantation survival exist? The
answer is obvious, and Judge Easterbrook’s decision in
Weinstein v. University of Illinois upholds U.S. science
tradition, that is, that a research scientist who does the work
at a minimum retains the moral rights of attribution, integrity,
retraction, and disclosure. These four moral rights are essential
to research scientists’ careers and are essential to ensure
research science quality if scientific research is to survive as a
profession in the United States.67
2.

Who Owns and Controls Scientific Research in the
United States?

The answer to who owns or controls scientific research
depends on a complex body of national and international
(treaties) law, governmental regulatory policy regarding the
administration of federal research funding awards, research
science professional ethical standards, and individual academic
institutions’ or commercial firm’s administrative policies.68
67. 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
68. See Seymour, supra note 21, at 12-20; see also Meyer, supra note 21;
DAVIES & GARNETT, supra note 15, at 3-67, 857-954, 1012, 1128-33. 42 C.F.R.
§ 93.103 provides:
Research misconduct means the fabrication, falsification, or
plagiarism in proposing, performing or reviewing research
or reporting research results. (a) Fabrication is making up
data or results and recording or reporting them. (b)
Falsification
is
manipulating
research
materials,
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equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or
results such that research is not accurately represented in
the research record. (c) Plagiarism is the appropriation of
another’s ideas, processes, results, or words without giving
proper credit [attribution]. (d) Research misconduct does not
include honest error or difference of opinion.
42 C.F.R. § 93.103 (2011); see also SIGMA XI, HONOR IN SCIENCE, supra note
24, at 39 (“Truthfulness may or may not be the cement that holds together
society as a whole, but certainly it is essential to science.”) (emphasis added);
SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 22 (“Experimental
results are property that someone owns. The ownership of ideas is important;
it has a bearing on promotion, and ideas [copyrights, patents] sometimes can
be sold for profit. Conflicts of interest exist.”). Regarding institutional
policies, see, for example, Seymour, supra note 21, at 8 n.40 (quoting
professors’ publications policy, i.e., whether the academic investigator-author
or university owns intellectual property created by professors) (emphasis
added) (internal citations omitted), stating that at Brown University:
It is the policy of Brown University that ownership of the
copyright in a work shall belong to the author or authors of
the work, with certain stated exceptions. The exceptions to
this policy that shall vest ownership of the copyright in a
work with Brown University, rather than with the author or
authors of the work are: (1) if the work is a work-made-forhire as defined in the U.S. copyright law; (2) if the work is
defined as an “Institutional work” under Section 2.4 below .
. . Copyrightable works of scholarly research, course
materials or artistic works made by faculty members would
not be considered works-made-for-hire and are property of
the author and authors.
Id. But see Seymour, supra note 21, at 8 n.41 (emphasis added) (regarding
Cornell University’s policy):
This default position [that copyright ownership initially
vests with the author] is based largely on the practices at
peer institutions. This is a policy determination and not one
based on legal precedent. Under U.S. copyright law,
employers own the copyright to works created by their
employees. Faculty are legally employees of the University.
Despite a widely held belief among academics that there is a
“faculty exception” to the work-for-hire-doctrine, the reality
is there are very few cases (none in our jurisdiction)
recognizing an exception and then only with respect to
scholarly publications (and all pre-date the latest (1976)
revision to the copyright statute). There are, therefore, no
legal constraints on the University in formulating this
policy position.
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An apparent modern legal fiction is to effectively develop
intellectual property for commercial use and public benefit; the
intellectual property rights of the individual scientist must be
transferred to the employer, entrepreneur or government.69
One may legitimately ask: under what precedent or authority
did this modern “legal fiction” evolve and persist?
For federally funded research, there is no basis in law or
statute for the answer that by default an employer owns
research he did not personally conceive, direct or create, but
rather this “policy” evolved as a solution to a Congressional
mandate to the Public Health Service (PHS) to address science
misconduct related to federally funded research.70 This latter
Id.(quoting Comm. on Intellectual Prop., Cornell Univ., Draft Report from
Intellectual Property Committee 3 n.1 (Mar. 27, 2003) (unpublished draft),
available at
http://theuniversityfaculty.cornell.edu/forums/pdfs/CopyrightReportRev.pdf);
Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982):
[T]he heart of the system consists in the right of the
individual faculty members to teach, carry on research, and
publish without interference from the government,
community, the university administration, or his fellow
faculty members. . . . [W]e think it clear that whatever
constitutional protection is afforded by the First
Amendment extends as readily to the scholar in the
laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom.
Id. (emphasis added).
69. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1127-29.
70. Howard Waldeman, Ownership, Access, Retention, and Sharing of
Research Data Produced by PHS Grants or Contracts and CRADAS, in DATA
MANAGEMENT IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP APRIL 1990,
at 86-89 (1990). Mr. Waldeman states:
III. Grants: (1) Ownership:
When PHS awards a research grant, the data developed by
the grantee institution is owned by the grantee institution
unless there is a specific condition to the contrary inserted
in the grant award statement. This legal principle is a
matter of PHS practice and policy; there are no regulations
which explicitly prescribe it.
Id. at 86 (emphasis added); see also Appendix A: Summary of Breakout
Session, in DATA MANAGEMENT IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: REPORT OF A
WORKSHOP APRIL 1990, at 96(1990):
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PHS “policy” is directly contrary to research science practice in
fact.71 The Public Health Service (PHS) offices involved in
“research integrity,” solely as a function of a PHS policy of
convenience,72 appear to have conflated legitimate regulatory
The group also dealt with the question of data ownership,
namely whether the university or the investigator should
retain the data. There was strong consensus that the
investigator has the primary responsibility for data
retention,
maintenance,
and
appropriate
sharing
[disclosure]. The university shares responsibility for
maintaining the data, but custody should reside with the
investigator.
Id. (emphasis added); NIH Grants Policy Statement, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND
HUM. SERVICES,
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2010/nihgps_ch8.html#_Availabilit
y_of_Research (last updated Oct. 20, 2011).
71. Michael Jackson & Felix Khin-Maung-Gyi, The George Washington
Med. Ctr., Perspective of an Academic Institution, in DATA MANAGEMENT IN
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP APRIL 1990, at 23 (1990).
Jackson and Khin-Maung-Gyi state: “[T]he view that investigators’ interest in
their data are primary is a widely accepted principle of the biomedical
research culture, and one that is subscribed to by the editors of scientific
journals who solicit copyright transfer from individual authors without
requirement of institutional approval.” Id.
72. See also Waldeman, supra note 70, at 91:
The following issues related to the Federal government were
noted:
The PHS requirement that institutions must retain grant
records for three years was evidently written to apply
principally to financial records. Recently, and not in accord
with common institutional practices, PHS has interpreted
this regulation to apply also to all data and materials
relevant to a research project. This extrapolation is viewed as
inappropriate and unwarranted, and should be corrected.
Id. (emphasis added); cf. 45 C.F.R. § 74.53 (2011):
(a) This section sets forth requirements for record retention
and access to records for awards to recipients.
(b) Financial records, supporting documents, statistical
records, and all other records pertinent to an award shall be
retained for a period of three years from the date of
submission of the final expenditure report or, for awards
that are renewed quarterly or annually, from the date of the
submission of the quarterly or annual financial report . . . .
(g) Paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this section apply to the
following types of documents, and their supporting records:
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financial responsibility of the grantee organization to account
for federal grant awards expenditure with actual scientific
research data records generated by the research scientist.73
This latter arguably aberrant PHS “policy and practice”74
seems to have evolved coincidently with several political
events: the Congressional “Science Misconduct” hearings led by
Congressional Representative John D. Dingell and the BayhDole Act, University and Small Business Patent Procedures
Act of 198075 for private institutions, and its counterpart for
government agencies, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act.76 Third, U.S. security concerns exacerbated by
9/11 have resulted in science community concern of federal
government restriction of even “unclassified but sensitive
[UBS]” scientific research as an express condition of receipt of
federal grant or contract support or simply via unspecified peer
journal editorial decision.77 The first delegated to institutions
receiving federal research funds a new responsibility to “police”
science misconduct allegations pertaining to their research
science staff.78 The second, Bayh-Dole, encouraged institutions
Indirect cost rate computations or proposals, cost allocation
plans, and any similar accounting computations of the rate
at which a particular group of costs is chargeable (such as
computer usage chargeback rates or composite fringe
benefit rates) . . . . (2) . . . the 3-year retention period for the
proposal, plan, or other computation and its supporting
records starts at the end of the fiscal year (or other
accounting period) covered by the proposal, plan, or other
computation.
Id.
73. 45 C.F.R. § 74.53.
74. Id.
75. University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 (BayhDole Act of 1980), Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§
200-212 (2006)). Bayh-Dole controls allocation of rights to inventions made by
employees of small business firms and domestic nonprofit organizations,
including universities, in federally assisted programs. Id.
76. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (2006))
(“[T]he Federal Government shall strive where appropriate to transfer owned
and originated technology to state and local governments and to the private
sector.”).
77. See generally NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2.
78. See Waldeman, supra note 70, at 91; 45 C.F.R. § 74.53 (2011); Public
Health Services Policies on Research Misconduct, 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93 (2011)
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receiving federal funds to acquire intellectual property
ownership in their research staff’s work ostensibly to facilitate
technology transfer of federally funded research discovery to
commercial benefit of the public and also share license and
royalties with both the academic institution and research
scientist inventors.79 Stevenson-Wydler was amended by the
Federal Technology Transfer Act in 1986.80 This amendment
“attempted to institutionalize technology transfer in
government [research] laboratories, by among other things,
making technology transfer a component of employee
evaluation.”81 “Homeland security” legislation, Executive
Orders of the George W. Bush Administration and policies
promulgated by executive agencies post-9/11, have had an
arguably “chilling,” if not in fact research censorship impact on
scientific research in the U.S. supported by federal funding.82
The latter United States Executive post-9/11 security action is
a broad complex topic. Discussion of post-9/11 executive action
(effective June 16, 2005).
79. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006).
80. Federal Technology Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(1986).
81. Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An
Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing
Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 353 (2008).
82. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act) §
1016, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006));
Homeland Security Act of 2002, §§ 301-313, Pub. L. 107-296, (codified at 6
U.S.C. § 185 (2006)); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201);
Homeland Security Presidential [George W. Bush] Directives/HSPD 1-14
[unclassified versions], in NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES IN SCIENCE, LAW, AND
TECHNOLOGY 543-634 (Thomas A. Johnson ed. 2007); see Julie E. Fischer,
STEWARDSHIP OR CENSORSHIP, BALANCING BIOSECURITY, THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH,
AND THE BENEFITS OF SCIENTIFIC OPENNESS
(2006), available at
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Stewardship.pdf;
see
also Steven E. Miller, After the 9/11 Disaster: Washington’s Struggle to
Improve Homeland Security, AXESS STOCKHOLM, Mar. 2003, at 8-11, available
at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/254/after_the_911_disaster.ht
ml; TANIA SIMONCELLI & JAY STANLEY, SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION’S ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY,
THE AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2005); Donald Kennedy, Science and Secrecy,
289 SCI. 724, 724 (Aug. 4, 2000). See generally Harold C. Relyea, Presidential
Directives: Background and Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. (Nov. 26, 2008),
available at http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/CRS-98-611.pdf.
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is limited herein to its impact on intellectual property rights of
research scientists to claim creative authorship and to freely
divulge the results of “unclassified” scientific investigative
findings and discoveries; the scientists’ copyright first
publication; and, related First Amendment free speech rights
such as patent inventorship and patent “secrecy” classification.
a.

Public Health Service (PHS) Research Science
Misconduct Policy Provides for Research
Ownership to the Grantee Institution, Removing
from the Research Scientist Author-CreatorInventor

Scientists, unlike their professional counterparts in
medicine and law, do not answer to any formal scientific
professional regulatory body for violations of ethical and moral
professional standards.83 There is no regulatory counterpart,
“American Scientific Research Association,” for practice of
scientific research, to the American Medical Association (AMA)
for license and practice of medicine, or the American Bar
Association (ABA) for license and practice of law. Rather, by
neglecting to formally organize and regulate themselves,
research scientists arguably have fostered default federal
executive agency regulation.84
Historically, professional research scientists (PhD and
M.D.-researchers) have been assumed to be “self-regulated” by
their employer-institution and via prepublication peer review

83. See, e.g., COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS AND PRACTICES TO PREVENT
DESTRUCTIVE APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 63 (2004) [hereinafter
FINK
REPORT],
available
at
https://download.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309089778 (“There is a deep
and long-standing foundation of scientific self-regulation, voluntary
standards, and associated accreditation. Given the fundamentally
international character of research in the life sciences, any serious attempt to
prevent the misuse of research must include efforts at improving and
harmonizing standards and practices internationally.”) (emphasis added);
COMM. ON NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 63.
84. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 63 (“There is a deep and longstanding foundation of scientific self-regulation, voluntary standards, and
associational accreditation.”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3

28

JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES

704

11/13/2012 9:03 AM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

of their research work-product.85 Peer review regulates science
publication but lacks investigative or enforcement authority to
address fraud, plagiarism, or misappropriation.86 Society
membership is for all practical purposes pro forma.87 While
ostensibly promoting personal and institutional responsibility,
such laissez-faire ethics by research scientists prompted
government action; where research scientists’ professed
“professional self-regulation” failed to create standards, proper
investigative procedures, and disciplinary enforcement.
Prior to the early 1980s Congressional involvement,
professional societies, government research grant (funding)
agencies, and nongovernmental review agencies, while
promoting education in ethical behavior, had no legal authority
or power to regulate research scientists’ professional acts, even
those in transparent violation of written ethical behavior
standards (e.g. plagiarism, misappropriation of another’s
ideas/work product, fraud, or retaliation for reporting of
unethical behavior).88 The result has been that, absent formal
ethics adjudication standards, investigative processes, and
disciplinary enforcement processes, the scientists are now
facing piecemeal standards drafted by government officials in
fourteen executive agencies.89 Research scientists have, via
inaction, largely forfeited authority to self-regulate as a unified
body of professionals.90
b.

Political Considerations Fostering Government
and Institution “Oversight Ownership” of U.S.
Research Science

Science misconduct came into the political spotlight when
“Albert Gore, Jr., Chairman of the Investigations and

85. Id.
86. Id. at 116.
87. Id. at 62-64.
88. Public Health Services Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed.
Reg. 28,370 (May 17, 2005) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93).
89. FRANCIS L. MACRINA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY: TEXT AND CASES IN
RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 14 (3d ed. 2005).
90. Public Health Services Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed.
Reg. at 28,370.
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Oversight Subcommittee of the House Science and Technology
Committee, held the first hearing on the emerging problem.
The hearing was prompted by the public disclosure of research
misconduct cases at four major research centers in 1980.”91
Prior to 1986, reports of scientific misconduct had been
reported directly to the PHS agencies funding the research in
question. In 1986, NIH directed the reporting of science
misconduct be done through the NIH Institutional Liaison
Office.92 In 1985, Congress passed the Health Research
Extension Act.93 This Act required the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to issue a regulation requiring applicant of
awardee institutions of federal research grant funds to
establish “an administrative process to review reports of
scientific fraud”94 and “to report to the Secretary any
investigation of alleged scientific fraud which appears
substantial.”95
In the 1980s, U.S. Congressional oversight of scientific
fraud in federally funded biomedical research was under
intense legislative and public scrutiny primarily due to
Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee.96 Representative Dingell’s
House Committee funded the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), one, if not the largest, of several sources of federal
research grant support.97 Federal funding for science research
91. Historical Background, OFF. OF RES. INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2011, 3:17
pm), https://ori.hhs.gov/historical-background.
92. Id.
93. Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-158, 99 Stat.
820 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
94. Health Research Extension Act § 493, 42 U.S.C. § 289(b) (2012).
95. Id.; see NIKOLAS KONTARATOS, DISSECTING A DISCOVERY, THE REAL
STORY OF HOW THE RACE TO UNCOVER THE CAUSE OF AIDS TURNED SCIENTISTS
AGAINST DISEASE, POLITICS AGAINST SCIENCE, NATION AGAINST NATION 158162(2006).
96. JUDY SARASOHN, THE DAVID BALTIMORE AFFAIR, SCIENCE ON TRIAL:
THE WHISTLEBLOWER, THE ACCUSED, AND THE NOBEL LAUREATE 60 (1993).
97. Id. at 60-61 (On April 12, 1988, Representative John D. Dingell
convened a hearing entitled “Scientific Fraud and Misconduct and the
Federal Response” before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations. Dingell noted he was shocked that National
Institutes of Health (NIH) relied on institutions to investigate allegations of
science misconduct among their own staff. Dingell went on to liken this
process to a “fox actively investigating the chicken coup.” This hearing began
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was increasing and Dingell considered NIH and university
mechanisms for dealing with science fraud inadequate.98 In
particular, several cases, including the Robert Gallo and the
David Baltimore cases, of alleged scientific misconduct by
prominent U.S. senior research scientists, had attracted
negative international attention to U.S. federally funded
scientific research.99
In March 1989, the PHS created the Office of Scientific
Integrity (OSI) in the Office of the Director, National Institutes
of Health (NIH), and the Office of Science Integrity Review
(OSIR) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health
(OASH).100 In 1992, OSI and OSIR were consolidated into the
Office of Research Integrity (ORI) in OASH; and HHS
established a Research Integrity Adjudications Panel of the
Departmental Appeals (DAB).101
Dingell’s own formal investigation of the Baltimore case of alleged scientific
misconduct.); see also OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 32 (2010), available at
http://ori.hhs.gov/images/ddblock/ori_annual_report_2009.pdf
(Research
misconduct activity has increased from 159 allegations, inquiries or
investigations in 1993, to 230 in 2008.); LAWRENCE J. RHOADES, OFFICE OF
RESEARCH INTEGRITY, NEW INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH MISCONDUCT ACTIVITY:
1992-2001,
at
11
(2004),
available
at
http://ori.dhhs.gov/documents/NewInstitutionalResearchMisconductActivity.p
df (“The number of institutions responding to allegations of research
misconduct has grown steadily from 1992-2001 and is expected to continue to
do so.”); Sarah Glazer, Combating Science Misconduct, Are Government
Investigations Unfair?, CQ RESEARCHER, Jan. 10, 1997, at 5, 6, 11, available
at
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre199701100
0#Sidebar1REF[1] (“Science fraud became an even bigger issue in April 1988,
when Rep. Dingell launched hearings on the [David] Baltimore case before
his Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.”).
98. DANIEL J. KEVLES, THE BALTIMORE CASE: A TRIAL OF POLITICS,
SCIENCE, AND CHARACTER 136 (1998); see also JOHN CREWDSON, SCIENCE
FICTIONS: A SCIENTIFIC MYSTERY, A MASSIVE COVER-UP, AND THE DARK LEGACY
OF ROBERT GALLO 13 (2002); Lawrence B. Altman, Discoverers of AIDS and
Cancer
Win
Nobel,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
7,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/health/07nobel.html.
99. KONTARATOS, supra note 95, at 155-157; see also CREWDSON, supra
note 98, at 13; SHANE CROTTY, AHEAD OF THE CURVE, DAVID BALTIMORE’S LIFE
IN SCIENCE (2001); KEVLES, supra note 98; SARASOHN supra note 96; Altman,
supra note 98.
100. Historical
Background,
OFF.
OF
RES.
INTEGRITY,
http://ori.dhhs.gov/about/history.shtml (last updated Nov. 9, 2011).
101. Id.
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Although having different outcomes, these two cases,
David Baltimore and Robert Gallo, are of particular import
because both illustrate the intrinsic conflict of interest of
institution or agency self-investigation PHS mandated process:
absence
of
“due
process,”
politically
motivated
misrepresentation, economic self-interest of the investigative
executive agency trumping established U.S. patent law,
government mandated retraction of scientific findings
subsequently found valid, and irreparable harm, irrespective of
innocence or guilt, resulting to accused and plaintiff research
scientists.102 The Baltimore case is egregious: ruined careers,
financially devastating legal costs for defense against the U.S.
government’s “abuse of process,” a process devoid of any
pretense of due process or merit, before total vindication of two
innocent scientists ten years later.103
The David Baltimore Case is summarized as follows:
David Baltimore (born March 7, 1938), PhD,104 1975
Nobelist
for
reverse
transcriptase
discovery:
RNAtranscription-into-DNA, refuting the DNA Dogma, DNA-toRNA-to-protein-never the reverse;105 age 52 in 1990 when
formal allegations (informal, made in 1986)106 were made that
he and Dr. Thereza Imanishi-Kari had committed science
misconduct.
102. SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 7:
Over the next few years, [Margot] O’Toole [Baltimore and
Imanisishi-Kari’s accuser] would find her scientific career in
shreds; Imanishi-Kari’s reputation would be in ruins; even
the president of Rockefeller University, Nobel-prize winner
David Baltimore, who put his personal stamp of approval on
the publication of the study, would be dragged into the
controversy and eventually forced to resign.
Id.
103. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 205 (quoting Bernadine Healy, the former
Director of NIH).
104. SARASOHN,
supra
note
96,
at
77-78;
Autobiography,
NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1975/baltimoreautobio.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).
105. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 114-15; KEVLES, supra note 98, at 9;
SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 78-80.
106. KEVLES, supra note 98, at 67, 138.
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Affliation: President, Rockefeller University, faculty forced
Dr. Baltimore’s resignation Dec. 2, 1991.107
Current: Robert A. Millikan, Professor of Biology,
Calfornia Institute of Technology (Caltech).108
Charge: Data fabrication, scientific misconduct, by Thereza
Imanishi-Kari, a David Baltimore mentee and coauthor
collaborator of the research in question; accuser was Margot
O’Toole, a postdoctoral fellow in Imanishi-Kari’s laboratory.109
Initially, he tried to explain the results, but under continued
intense legal pressure, Dr. Baltimore retracted the paper in
question.110 Note: A retraction is a complete repudiation of the
content of a scientific publication. A retraction is the legal
equivalent of a “no contest” admission the science misconduct
allegation is valid.
Law: After the University had investigated and cleared
Baltimore and Imanishi-Kari,111 this case was “pursued” by
various federal agencies, including: repeated investigations by
various National Institutes of Health (NIH) agencies, a
Congressional investigation headed by Representative John D.
Dingell, a self-appointed Congressional science “fraud-buster”
who recruited Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Secret
Service forensics in his “investigation.”112 It was noted that
Baltimore used the resources of the Whitehead Institute, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) affiliate, he
directed to hire a team of high-powered attorneys, from two
firms, one in Boston, one in Washington, D.C., to represent
himself. Thereza Imanishi-Kari’s defense was handled
primarily pro bono by Bruce Singal, a former federal prosecutor
and partner in the firm of Ferriter, Scobbo, Sikora, Caruso &
Rodophele, Holyoke, Massachusetts.113 Shane Crotty indicated
107. Id. at 10, 287; SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 248-249.
108. KEVLES, supra note 98, at 12.
109. KEVLES, supra note 98, at 67-95, 208, 216; SARASOHN, supra note
96, at 269.
110. SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 107, 217-220, 265.
111. Id. at 217.
112. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 158; KEVLES, supra note 98, at 223;
SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 86-87.
113. SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 82-83, 95; Handling Misconduct –
Inquiry Issues, OFF. OF RES. INTEGRITY, http://ori.hhs.gov/ori-responses-issues
(last updated Apr. 19, 2011).
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Dr. Baltimore contributed more than $100,000 for an attorney
to defend Thereza Imanishi-Kari, a Brazilian scientist he had
mentored.114 Dr. Imanishi-Kari was investigated by a grand
jury in Baltimore for the science misconduct charges. However,
on July 13, 1992, the U.S. Attorney Richard D. Bennet declined
to prosecute because he did not believe he could persuade a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.115 Both Dr. David Baltimore, a
Nobel Laureate, and Dr. Thereza Imanishi-Kari were finally
cleared of wrong-doing 10 years after the first accusations were
brought against them.116 [T]he public damage to these two
scientists’ personal lives and science careers fills several books

ORI permits, but neither requires nor provides counsel for
respondents, complainants, and other participants in
misconduct proceedings. An institution must decide to
whom it should provide counsel, and if counsel should be
provided. . . . [W]hile parties may arrange for their own
counsel, reimbursement is not available from the Federal
government under the Equal Access to Justice Act in
hearings before the Departmental Appeals Board [DAB].
Id. See also KEVLES, supra note 98, at 330. Imanishi-Kari was defended on
appeal by Joseph Onek, of the Washington D.C. firm of Crowell & Moring.
Onek concluded:
This case has been a nightmare for Dr. Imanishi-Kari for
almost a decade. During this same decade, a number of other
scientists have been falsely accused of misconduct. This
panel’s decision will not only vindicate Dr. Imanshi-Kari,
but will bring to an end an ignoble chapter in the history of
American science.
Id. (emphasis added).
114. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 148, 150, 201.
115. SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 264 (This burden of proof for finding of
science misconduct has since been reduced by DHHS to mere “preponderance
of the evidence.”); Stanley G. Korenman, 8: Malfeasance and Misconduct,
OFF. OF RES. INTEGRITY,
http://ori.dhhs.gov/education/products/ucla/chapter8/Chapter8.pdf (last
visited July 16, 2012) (“A finding of research misconduct requires that – (a)
There be a significant departure from accepted practices of the relevant
research community; and (b) The misconduct be committed intentionally, or
knowingly, or recklessly; and (c) The allegation be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence.”).
116. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 205; see also Imanishi-Kari, No. 1582,
1996 WL 399931, at *1 (D.A.B. June 21, 1996).
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and reams of published scientific professional journal
commentary.117
Consequences: One point upon which everyone involved
agrees is that all of the preliminary investigations, including
the one by Congress, were sorely mishandled in that the
scientific issues at the heart of the controversy were never
properly investigated by unbiased, scientifically competent
personnel until almost 10 years after initial charges were
brought.118 The question of possible science misconduct and or
fraud early became “politically charged” both by the stature of
Dr. Baltimore and the sums of public health service funding
that had supported these two scientists’ research. The several
initial NIH oversight agencies tasked with “research integrity
oversight” were admittedly tainted by overt bias going to lack
of objectivity in their investigations and the fraud
investigators’ findings were eventually discounted.119
Finally, in 1996 the NIH Appeals Board held “a trial-like
hearing,” amassing “over 6500 pages of hearing transcript,
[seventy] laboratory notebooks, the entire collection of Secret
Service evidence, Imanishi-Kari’s supporting documents, and
the ORI’s [Office of Research Integrity’s] obsessive list of
thousands of ‘findings of fact and conclusions of law.’”120 The
Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) is available to scientists
accused and found guilty of misconduct by their employerinstitutes and ORI. It is composed of one to three judges.
The appeals panel demolished the Office of
Research Integrity, ORI’s findings. “The panel
cleared Imanishi-Kari’s name in their opening
comments: ‘Because the history of this case
involved a direct attack on Dr. Imanishi-Kari’s
honesty, we evaluated her statements carefully,
and relied primarily on evidence in the record
other than her testimony. . . The credibility of
her testimony before us was bolstered, however,
117. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 139-220; see also Glazer, supra note 97.
118. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 201-20; KELVES, supra note 98, at 11-12.
119. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 201; see also Imanishi-Kari, 1996 WL
399931, at *110.
120. CROTTY, supra note 99, at 201.
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when much of the evidence in the record, and in
particular, some of the document examination
evidence, corroborated her statements and
directly contradicted representations made by
ORI.’ They continued, ‘ORI’s description of the
forensics findings were not always dependable.
For example, as described by ORI, one type of
Secret Service analysis seemed to provide
support (albeit limited) for ORI’s position on two
important issues. . . . The actual results,
however, were not as described and were
consistent with (indeed, arguably substantiated)
Dr. Imanishi-Kari’s version of events (which was
also corroborated by other evidence.)’ . . . The
Secret Service and the ORI could ascribe no
motive for Imanishi-Kari to fabricate such
useless [unpublished] data, and most of their
examples of ‘fraud’ centered on unpublished
data, falsification of which made no sense. The
ORI’s logic baffled the appeals panel. . . . In
particular, the panel found that the infamous
seventeen pages of data that obsessed O’Toole
[Imanishi-Kari’s accuser], Feder and Stewart
contained nothing fraudulent or unseemly. . . But
the appeals panel concluded that the Secret
Service techniques didn’t work even on
laboratory notebooks whose veracity was
unchallenged, including Margot O’Toole’s. . . The
appeals panel became even more skeptical of the
Secret Service work when it became clear that
Dingell’s aides had met with them and told them
what data were ‘good’ and what were suspicious.
. . Ironically, the panel also noted that the ORI’s
statistician, Dr. Dahlberg, who accused
Imanishi-Kari of data selection, engaged in data
selection and interpretation of his own. Under
intensive investigation, Imanishi-Kari’s data
selection technique was corroborated by other
immunologists
who
analyzed
the
data.
Dahlberg’s [PHS-ORI] own data selection
technique held up less well; he had strayed from
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what other statisticians noted were ‘more
accurate’ techniques. . . [Re: Margot O’Toole, the
accuser’s, partisan stand] Such involvement can
compromise both the ability of the investigators
to maintain objectivity and the ability of the
whistleblower to avoid becoming too vested in
the outcome. We [the appeal panel] think that
happened here.”121
Bernadine Healy, the former Director of NIH, summed up
the Imanishi-Kari & Baltimore case as follows: “‘There was a
lot of cruelty and abusive behavior tolerated in the name of
rooting out fraud,’ when actually, ‘the fraud, the abuse, the
dishonesty, was in the [federal government’s] process.’”122
The Robert Gallo case resulted in tremendous economic
gain for the U.S. government by defending Robert Gallo, a NIH
research scientist’s, contested claim of first discovery and,
thereby, means to detect and screen patients for HIV/AIDS
infection. The Gallo case illustrates well PHS agency selfinvestigation
conflict-of-interest
given
high
economic
intellectual property right’s stakes.
The Robert Gallo case is summarized as follows:
Robert Charles Gallo, M.D. (born 1937)123 initial
121. Id. at 201-04 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 205 (emphasis added); see also KEVLES, supra note 98, at 1112, stating:
This book is also about the civil rights of scientists,
particularly Thereza Imanishi-Kari. Once I [Kelves] started
studying the record of this case, several points became
quickly evident:
Imanishi-Kari had not had a fair trial.
She had been convicted in the court of public opinion
and nowhere else.
Those who condemned Baltimore for defending his
colleague over-looked or were indifferent to crucial
aspects of the case, among others.
. . . In June 1996 [a decade after allegations were made]
Thereza Imanishi-Kari was officially exonerated on all the
counts that had been brought against her.
123. Gallo, Robert Charles, ACADEMIC DICTIONARIES AND ENCYCLOPEDIAS,
http://scientists.enacademic.com/539/Gallo_,_Robert_Charles (last visited
Aug. 24, 2012).
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allegations surfaced about 1985.124
Affiliation: National Cancer Institute (NCI), National
Institutes of Health (NIH) when allegations made,125 now
(2012) Professor of Medicine, Director, Institute of Human
Virology, an institution affiliated with the University of
Maryland Biotechnology Institute;126 also, cofounder of
Profectus BioScience, Inc., Baltimore, MD; and member of its
Scientific Advisory Board.127
Allegation: Misappropriated virus, claiming he made first
isolation of HIV/AIDS viral agent, from samples obtained from
Dr. Luc Montagnier, a collaborator at the Pasteur Institute,
Paris, France. U.S. and foreign patent issues regarding
HIV/AIDS blood test developed from isolated virus were
consequently in question.128
Issue 1: Not discussed, herein: whether Gallo
misappropriated Montagnier’s HIV/AIDS virus sent to him as a
professional courtesy, claiming the French virus as his own
discovery?
Issue 2: Whether Gallo et al. submitted to the U.S. Patent
and Trademark office as a novel “invention” an HIV/AIDS
diagnostic test patent application, ignoring the Montagnier, et
al.- prior filed two patent applications? Neither Gallo nor any
of Gallo’s laboratory research team were named co-inventors on
the two prior 1983 patent applications filed by filed Montagnier
et al..129

124. KONTARATOS, supra note 95, at 135.
125. KONTARATOS, supra note 95, at 46.
126. About
Dr.
Gallo,
INST.
OF
HUMAN
VIROLOGY,
http://www.ihv.org/about/robert_gallo.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2012);
Robert
C
Gallo
M.D.,
UNIV.
OF
MD.
SCH.
OF
MED.,
http://medschool.umaryland.edu/facultyresearchprofile/viewprofile.aspx?id=4
901 (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).
127. Scientific Advisory Board, PROFECTUS BIOSCIENCES, INC.,
http://profectusbiosciences.com/about_scientific.html (last visited Aug. 21,
2012).
128. KONTARATOS, supra note 95, at 135-36, 351-52, 354-55.
129. The French team filed two patent applications (Great Britain
provisional Sept. 15, 1983; U.S. provisional Dec. 5, 1983) cited within a
European Application (filed Sept. 9, 1984), claiming the Great Britain Sept.
15, 1983 priority date, 4 and 7 months, respectively, before Gallo filed his
first application on April 23, 1984 in the United States. See KONTARATOS,
supra note 95, at 350-352.
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Law: Gallo’s and his US co-inventors or the patent
counsels representing Gallo et al. in failing to acknowledge Dr.
Luc Montagnier’s et al. prior patent applications, GB 8324800
filed over 7 months (September 15, 1983) and U.S. 06/558,109
(provisional, filed Dec. 5, 1983) filed over 4 months, prior to
Gallo’s et al. (4,520,113, filed April 23, 1984) appear to have
violated Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP)
Chapter 2000-Duty of Disclosure, 2001 Duty of Disclosure,
Candor and Good Faith (codified at 37 CFR § 1.56). In
particular MPEP 2001.06(a) Prior Art Cited in Related Foreign
Applications [R-2]. MPEP 2121 Prior Art: General Level of
Operability/Enabling: “When the reference relied on clearly
anticipates or makes obvious all the elements of the claimed
invention, the reference is presumed to be operable.” (The right
of foreign priority is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 119 and the right of
U.S. priority is codified at § 120).130
130. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 (a), (f), (g)(1) (2010):
A person shall be entitled to a patent unlessThe invention was known or used by others in this country,
or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the
applicant for the patent, or…
(f)he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be
patented, or
(g)(1) during the course of any interference conducted under
section 135 or section 291, another inventor establishes, to
the extent permitted in section 104, that before such
person’s invention thereof the invention was made by such
other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed
...
Id.; PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW BASICS § 15.10 (2002). Rosenberg
explains the violation Gallo is alleged to have committed:
Because the grant of a patent is affected with a public
interest, an applicant owes uncompromising duty to report
to the Patent & Trademark Office all facts concerning
possible fraud or inequity underlying the applications in
issue [Interlego A.G. v. F.A.O. Schwartz, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q.
129, 136-37 (N.D. Ga. 1976)]. The defense of fraud is
generally made in two formulations. The first is in terms of
equivalent to common-law fraud. The second formulation is
in terms of the equity doctrine of unclean hands. The latter
is used when not all the elements of the common-law fraud
are available [Coal Processing Equip., Inc. v. Campbell, 211
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Given the facts of this case, Gallo et al. attorneys knew or
should have known of the prior Montagnier, et al. patent
applications filed September 1983 in Great Britain and related
U.S. application filed Dec. 5, 1983, and clearly failed to disclose
the prior patent applications’ existence to the U.S. PTO, a
required material fact, as probable “prior art.”131
– “Both the [NIH] attorneys and the PTO
examiner told the [Representative John D.
Dingell] subcommittee staff that numerous
aspects of the IP [French-Institute Pasteur, Luc
Montagnier, et al. foreign and US prior filed
patent applications] and LTCB work [with the
Institute Pasteur virus] were material to the
claims of Gallo et al. and should have been
disclosed. . . .”132
– “The Gallo et al. patent was issued in record
time . . . At the time the Gallo et al. patent
issued, the IP [Institute Pasteur] patent
application, submitted over four months prior to
the submission of the Gallo et al. patent
invention application, had not been touched. . .
The different handling of two applications for the
same invention has never been satisfactorily
explained. . . .”133

U.S.P.Q. 986, 1000 (S.D. Oh. 1981)]. . . . There is a twoprong test for establishing inequitable conduct before the
Patent & Trademark Office:
(1) The information withheld must be material; and
(2) The misrepresentation must have been intentional.
Id. (emphasis in original).
131. See U.S. Patent No. 4,520,113 (filed Apr. 23, 1984) (issued May 28,
1985); Investigation of the Institutional Response to the HIV Blood Test Patent
Dispute and Related Matters: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, §§ III-IV (1988)
(statement of Rep. Dingell, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce),
available at http://www.virusmyth.com/aids/hiv/gallo/ExeSum.html.
132. Id. at § IV.
133. Id. at § III.
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– According to the [U.S.] examiner, when she
first saw the IP [Institute Pasteur] application,
within two weeks of issuing Gallo et al., she
recognized immediately that PTO had “screwed
up” in issuing the Gallo et al. patent.134
– “The HHS response to the IP [Institute
Pasteur] challenge . . . was immediate and
reflexive. The response was to defend—at all
costs and irrespective of the evidence—the claims
of Gallo et al. The Subcommittee investigation
showed that HHS officials and attorneys
conducted a parody of an investigation; they did
not seek the truth, but rather sought to create an
official record to support the claims of Gallo et
al.”135
– HHS officials accepted uncritically everything
they were told by Dr. Gallo and his colleagues,
incorporating the LTCB scientists’ information
unqualifiedly and without confirmation into
official reports of the Department. When these
officials encountered hard evidence that
contradicted the NCI [National Cancer InstituteGallo’s employer]/HHS claims, the evidence was
ignored, discarded, and/or suppressed.136
Factual dated evidence in the patent applications on public
record in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and
European Patent Office (EP) today support the Congressional
Subcommittee’s (reconstructive) analysis for the second issue of
the conflicting patents filed.137
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Antigenes, moyens et method pour le diagnostic de
lymphadenopathie et du syndrome d’immuno-depression acquise, European
Patent No. 0,138,667 A2 (filed Sept. 14, 1984) (citing as priority patent
application, GB 8,324,800, filed Sept. 15, 1983) (issued April 24, 1985)
(inventive entity listed as Luc Montagnier, Francoise Barre-Sinoussi,
Francoise V[e]zinet-Brun, Christine Rouzioux, Willy Rosenbaum, Charles
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Consequences: Without including Gallo or any of Gallo’s
colleagues, Luc Montagnier filed his patent application first,
twelve (12) claims total, “GB [Great Britain] 8,324,800, filed
Sep. 15, 1983.”138 Without including Montagnier or any of
Dauguet, Jacqueline Gruest, Marie-Therese Nugeyre, Francoise Ray,
Claudine Axler-Blin, Solange Chamaret); Human Immunodeficiency Viruses
Associated with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), a Diagnostic
Method for AIDS and Pre-AIDS, and a Kit Therefore, U.S. Patent No.
4,708,818 (filed Oct. 8, 1985) (citing as priority Gr. Brit. Patent Application
No. 8,324,800, filed Sept. 15, 1983) (issued Nov. 24, 1987) (attributing
invention to Luc Montagnier, Jean-Claude Chermann, Francoise BarreSinoussi, Francoise Brun-Vezinet, Christine Rouzioux, Willy Rozenbaum,
Charles Dauguet, Jacqueline Gruest, Marie-Therese Nugeyre, Francoise Rey,
Claudine Axler-Blin, Solange Chamaret, (and purportedly added in 1987
interference settlement) Robert C. Gallo, Mikulas Popovic, and Mangalasseril
G. Sarngadharan) (specifically listing Great Britain Patent Application No.
8,324,800 under the “Foreign Application Priority Data” heading).
138. Absent inclusion of Gallo or any member of Gallo’s research team,
Montagnier and his French co-inventors’ team filed in Great Britain (GB),
patent application GB 8,324,800, on Sept. 15, 1983, which is cited as foreign
priority on all subsequent patent applications this research team filed in
1983 through 1984. Montagnier’s team filed a second U.S. patent application,
06/558,109 on Dec. 5, 1983, so that Montagnier et al. in fact filed two
(provisional?) patent applications before Gallo, et al. filed on April 23, 1984.
The U.S. PTO website,
http://www.pto.gov/patents/resources/types/provapp.jsp, states:
A provisional application for patent is a U.S. national
application for patent filed in the USPTO under 35 U.S.C. §
111(b). It allows filing without a formal patent claim, oath
or declaration, or any information disclosure (prior art)
statement. It provides the means to establish an early
effective filing date in a later filed non-provisional patent
application filed under 35 U.S.C. § 111(a). It also allows the
term “Patent Pending” to be applied in connection with the
description of the invention . . . . In accordance with 35
U.S.C. § 119(e), the corresponding non-provisional
application must contain or be amended to contain a specific
reference to the provisional application.
Id. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) 2138.05 "Reduction to Practice," states:
Reduction to practice may be an actual reduction [e.g.
laboratory data proof] or a constructive reduction to practice
which occurs when a patent application on the claimed
invention is filed. The filing of a patent application serves as
conception and constructive reduction to practice of the
subject matter described in the application. Thus the
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Montagnier’s research team, Gallo filed on Apr. 23, 1984, after
Montagnier’s filing dates, Gallo’s patent being essentially a
duplicate of Montagnier’s 1983 application minus two claims,
ten (10) claims total.139 According to U.S. and international
patent law, first filed becomes “prior art,” which precludes
“novelty” of later essentially similar inventions.140 Gallo’s 1984
patent application should never have been issued since it
apparently violates U.S. patent law.141
Section 102(e) is a codification of a Supreme
Court case [Alexander Milburn Co. v. DavisBournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926)] which
held that a United States patent is effective as a
reference against a subsequently filed United
States patent application of another as of its
filing date, and not as of the date it issued as a
patent. Thus, the date as of which the
specifications of United States patents become
prior art relates back to their filing dates – a
date on which their disclosures were not actually
available to the public.142
A 1987 settlement of the patent interference claims by the
French inventors ongoing two years purportedly was as follows:
inventor need not provide evidence of either conception or
actual reduction to practice when relying on the content of
the patent application. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352,
47 USPQ2d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A reduction to
practice can be done by another on behalf of the inventor. De
Solms v. Schoenwald, 15 USPQ2d 1507, 1510 (Bd. Pat. App.
& Inter. 1990). "While the filing of the original application
theoretically constituted a constructive reduction to practice
at the time, the subsequent abandonment of that
application also resulted in an abandonment of the benefit
of that filing as a constructive reduction to practice. The
filing of the original application is, however, evidence of
conception of the invention."
Id.
139.
140.
141.
142.

’113 Patent (emphasis added).
ROSENBERG, supra note 130, at § 7.11 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)).
See id.
Id.
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The names of Luc Montagnier, Franciose BarreSinousse, Jean-Claude Chermann, Francoise
Brun, and the rest of the Pasteur [Institute]
group would be added as inventors on Gallo’s
patent, and the names of Gallo, Popovic and
Sarngadharan to the Pasteur still-pending
application, which the [U.S.] patent office,
hopefully, would agree to issue. Rather than the
two competing but co-existing patents envisioned
by Salk [Jonas Salk polio vaccine inventor, a
mediator between Gallo and Montagnier], there
would be two shared patents. The deal depended
on the PTO’s [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office]
willingness to overlook the existence of two
patents for the same invention, which might be
made easier by the fact that both would be
owned jointly by HHS [U.S. Health and Human
Services] and the Pasteur [Institute, Paris, FR].
Because the Red Cross had been using the Gallo
test almost exclusively, the $4 million in annual
royalties being collected by the HHS was several
times the $500,000 earned by the French. After
redistribution imposed by the settlement, HHS
would end up with some $2 million a year, and
the Pasteur with about $1.5 million. The French
would hold the short end of the money stick.143
143. CREWDSON, supra note 98, at 294-95 (emphasis added); Human
Immunodeficiency Viruses Associated with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), a Diagnostic Method for AIDS and Pre-AIDS, and a Kit
Therefore, U.S. Patent No. 4,708,818 (filed Oct. 8, 1985) (Gr. Brit. Patent
Application No. 8,324,800 (filed Sept. 15, 1983)) (issued Nov. 24, 1987)
(attributing revised post-1987 settlement invention to Luc Montagnier, JeanClaude Chermann, Francoise Barre-Sinoussi, Francoise Brun-Vezinet,
Christine Rouzioux, Willy Rozenbaum, Charles Dauguet, Jacqueline Gruest,
Marie-Therese Nugeyre, Francoise Rey, Claudine Axler-Blin, Solange
Chamaret, Robert C. Gallo, Mikulas Popovic, and Mangalasseril G.
Sarngadharan). The Great Britain Patent No. 8,324,800 that is cited as
priority was filed absent any of Gallo’s team. Id. But see Serologic Detection
of Antibodies to HTLV-II in Sera of Patients with AIDS and Pre-AIDS
Conditions, U.S. Patent No. 4,520,113 (filed Apr. 23, 1984) (issued May 28,
1985) (attributing invention to Robert C. Gallo, Mikulas Popovic, and
Mangalasseril G. Sangadharan) (an indication that the 1987 settlement did
not in fact reciprocally co-attribute Gallo’s April 23, 1984-filed patent
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Besides the evidence in the two disputed patents, an
advanced search of the PTO website shows Luc Montagnier has
been named lead inventor on almost twice as many issued U.S.
patents as Robert Gallo.144
In 2008, Drs. Luc Montaignier and Franciose BarreSinousse received the Nobel Prize for discovery of the virus
causing AIDS; Dr. Robert Gallo was not mentioned.145
The late 1980’s-2001 was a time period when Congress
increased science research money, in particular to fund
HIV/AIDS and cancer research, but most research programs
also benefited.146 Then, abruptly after 9/11 in 2001, the
research budget devoted to life science research funding was

application to include the French team of Montagnier et al.).
144. Results of Search in U.S. Patent Collection Database for Luc
Montagnier,
USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE,
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (submit “in/montagnierluc” in Query field and then follow “Search” link) (last visited Aug. 1, 2012)
(returning 106 patents total); Results of Search in U.S. Patent Collection
Database for Robert C. Gallo, USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE
DATABASE,
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm
(submit
“in/gallo-robert-c” in Query field and then follow “Search” link) (returning 54
patents total) (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
145. Altman, supra note 98.
146. Eugenie Samuel Reich, Science After 9/11: How Research Was
Changed by the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, SCI. AM., Sep. 1, 2011,
available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-researchwas-changed-by-september-11-terrorist-attacks&page=2:
A major conduit for the shifts is the availability of money:
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), created
by consolidating 22 federal services and agencies in 2002 in
direct response to September 11, had a science budget that
peaked at $1.3 billion in 2006 before falling again to about
$700 million in 2011. Key science-funding agencies
including the National Science Foundation, the National
Institutes of Health and the U.S. Department of Energy,
also put money into research motivated by security concerns
(amounting to a total homeland security (this number does
not refer to DHS but to homeland security funding across all
agencies) research budget of $7.3 billion in 2011) and a
small amount of the U.S. Department of Defense money
associated with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ended up in
the hands of researchers as well-for example, by funding
work on explosives detection and weaponry.
Id. (emphasis added).
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proportionately reduced due to the billions of U.S. dollars spent
to fund military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the
new “Homeland Security.”147 Both political situations,
Representative Dingell’s scrutiny and proportionately reduced
federal expenditure for life sciences research after 9/11,
stimulated more investigation of possible fraud by U.S.
scientists.148
In the late 1980’s, the PHS-NIH-ORI,149 accused a
university research scientist funded by NIH, professor of
neurology at the University of Wisconsin, James H. Abbs, of
147. NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 71-72:
Gregory J. Pottie, UCLA School of Engineering and Applied
Science, commented at the September 2006 regional
meeting that in the context of national security sensor
networks, he has already witnessed examples of research
domains [biochemical sensors] where short-term thinking
on security has “directly damaged long-term research of
direct benefit to our national security.” . . . Several
university officials expressed concern about the direction
research funding in the life sciences has taken. Over the
past five years, there has been a remarkable increase of
funding for bioterrorism-related research, while longstanding research budgets in the life sciences have been cut
or have remained stagnant.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing R&D Funding Update on R&D in NIH FY 2007
House Appropriations, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI.,
http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd (last visited Aug. 18, 2012); Gregory J. Pottie,
Remarks Made at the Committee on a New Government-University
Partnership for Science and Security Western Regional Meeting at Stanford
University
(Sept.
27,
2006)),
available
at
www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/202006.pdf.
148. Investigation of the Institutional Response to the HIV Blood Test
Patent Dispute and Related Matters, by the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, pt. VI, Committee on Energy and Commerce (Representative
John D. Dingell, Chairman, April 1988); see also Glazer, supra note 97, at 11
(“Science fraud became an even bigger issue in April 1988, when Rep. Dingell
launched hearings on the [David] Baltimore case before his Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.”); RHOADES, supra
note 97, at 11 (“The number of institutions responding to allegations of
research misconduct has grown steadily from 1992-2001 and is expected to
continue to do so.”); OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, supra note 97, at 32. See
generally SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 56, 60-61.
149. These abbreviations stand for, respectively, Public Health ServiceNational Institutes of Health-Office of Research Integrity. See KEVLES,
supra note 98, at 290.
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scientific misconduct.150 Professor Abbs’ laboratory was the
only one of its kind studying human speech using x-ray
microbeam analysis. The court noted that scientific fraud is
much “in the news these days; and this case, the government
advises us in its brief, ‘is of far-reaching national
significance.’”151 The charge was that a recent article coauthored by Abbs contained graphs that had been traced from
graphs in a previous publication rather than generated by data
from the NIH grant research, as the article claimed.152 The
University of Wisconsin self-investigated the matter, clearing
Abbs.153
150. Abbs v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918, 927, 928 (7th Cir. 1992), vacating
756 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (The appellate court held that while the
government had violated the Administrative Procedure Act, Abbs may not
appeal an executive agency’s violation of administrative procedure absent
showing of personal injury, specifically under Administrative Procedure Act §
10(c) “irreparable harm, the judicial remedy therefore [being] inadequate.”).
151. Abbs, 963 F.2d, at 928 (citing Patricia K. Woolf, Deception in
Scientific Research, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 67 (1988)).
152. Id. at 921.
153. Abbs v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 1172, 1176-1177 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
The trial court found the following undisputed facts:
In 1987, a committee of the University of WisconsinMadison conducted an inquiry into allegations that plaintiff
Abbs had engaged in scientific misconduct, specifically, that
he had published certain curves in the Journal Neurology
that were traced from curves he had published previously,
rather than being from two different patients as plaintiff
represented. The university committee determined that
there was no need for formal investigation into the
allegations of scientific misconduct against Abbs and so
advised NIH’s Office of Extramural Research, in June 1987 .
. . [None-the-less t]he Office of Extramural Research of NIH
conducted additional inquiries into the Abbs matter and
obtained a report from a panel of experts questioning the
University of Wisconsin-Madison’s prior determination that
the allegations against Abbs did not warrant a formal
investigation. On January 12, 1990, the Acting Director of
the Office of Scientific Inquiry advised plaintiff Abbs that
his name and the fact that he was the subject of an
investigation had been entered into the Public Health
ALERT system, which serves to communicate information
about investigations and final determinations of [science]
misconduct to all Public Health Service agencies.
Id.
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Nonetheless, prior to beginning its own investigation, the
Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI-NIH-PHS) placed “in the
Public Health Service’s ‘ALERT’ system a notice that Dr.
James Abbs of the University of Wisconsin was being
investigated for scientific misconduct.154 The ALERT system
distributes such notices to all agencies of the Public Health
Service that make research grants.”155 Under the OSI-PHS
investigative procedure, Dr. Abbs: (1) would not have complete
access to the investigative file; (2) would not be allowed to
attend interviews with other witnesses; and (3) would not be
entitled to full evidentiary hearing before a finding of
misconduct was made.156
The issue before the Abbs court was: “whether the policies
and procedures governing such investigations comply with the
Administrative Procedure Act and the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment[?]”157 The
University was a co-plaintiff with Abbs, citing its economic
stake in Abbs’ NIH million-dollar-grant’s overhead, and both
sides moved for summary judgment.158 “In an accompanying
opinion the [district court] judge explained that while the
procedures employed by the Office of Scientific Integrity were
indeed invalid because adopted in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act . . . Abbs has no liberty or
property interest in continued funding by NIH, so even if the
proceedings were inadequate he had no constitutional claim.”159
154. Id.
155. Abbs, 756 F. Supp., at 1177-78.
156. Id. at 1176.
157. Id. at 1176.
158. Id. at 1176.
159. Abbs, 963 F.2d at 922 (emphasis added); Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at
1182-1183. The trial court stated:
Plaintiff Abbs contends that he has a constitutionally
protected property interest that derives from the
interrelationship of federal funding with his career
advancement and income. . . . As important as such funding
is to plaintiff Abbs, however, it does not constitute a
constitutionally protected property interest unless his claim
to it is legally enforceable by contract or under state or
federal law. . . . As to future federal funding, plaintiff Abbs
has no enforceable right to receive grants or awards,
whatever his status as researcher. . . . As to current grants,
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Abbs challenged the lack of a constitutional claim on appeal.160
The U.S. Seventh Circuit dismissed Abbs’ appeal.161 The
court reasoned that:
Section 493(b) of the Public Health Service Act,
42 U.S.C. § 289b(b), directs NIH to establish a
“process” for responding to complaints of
scientific fraud. Pursuant to this directive, but
without notice or opportunity for public
comment, the predecessor of the Office of
Scientific Integrity had announced “Policies and
Procedures for Dealing with Possible Misconduct
in Science” in the July 18, 1986, issue of an NIH
publication called NIH Guide for Grants and
Contracts.162
The Appeals court in its conclusion noted:
Of course no one likes to be accused of
misconduct. The district court judge remarked
that “the fact that Abbs might ultimately be
cleared of the accusations against him . . . is as
unconvincing as arguing that persons charged
with felonies have no cognizable interest in the
trial procedures afforded them because they
might be acquitted.” But a criminal defendant
cannot bring a suit to enjoin the procedures
under which he is to be tried. No more can Dr.
Abbs.163

he is not the grantee [see page 1176, University of WisconsinMadison, his employer, the legal grantee] and [Abbs,
therefore,] can claim no property rights in the funding for
these grants.
Id. (emphasis added).
160. Abbs, 963 F.2d at 921.
161. Id. at 928.
162. Id. at 921.
163. Id. at 928 (citing Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at 1181.)
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The verdict in Abbs aptly illustrates both the need for
moral rights non-waivable assignment to research scientists
(not the grantee institution) as well as the need for a research
scientists regulatory body (an impartial body equivalent to the
ABA for lawyers), and not PHS, to promulgate, adjudicate, and
enforce scientific research ethical standards. The Abbs courts
noted that the existing PHS policy violated the Administrative
Procedure Act, but held Abbs had no liberty or property
interest in his own scientific research, so Abbs lacked a
constitutional claim.164
Further, as the Abbs court noted, a default PHS policy that
the grantee institution owns the research data165 further places
the research scientist at disadvantage in court regarding
standing, because the scientist is simply deemed under PHS
policy (arguable, as discussed below in conflict with federal
intellectual property law) to have no intellectual property
ownership or control of his own creative research
accomplishments.166
In short, U.S. scientists have lost, via (allegedly)
unchallenged executive agency abuse of authority, the “fuel of
interest” from their own “fire of genius” that Abraham Lincoln
had celebrated.167 Absent U.S. adoption of inalienable moral
attribution (paternity), integrity, retraction, and disclosure

164. Abbs, 963 F.2d at 921 (“[T]he district judge never entered an
injunction against its [Office of Scientific Integrity] conducting the
investigation [science misconduct alleged against Dr. Abbs] by the procedures
she had held invalid.”); Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at 1182-1183 (“As to current
grants, he [Dr. Abbs] is not the grantee [University of Wisconsin-Madison,
Abb’s employer, the legal grantee] and [Dr. Abbs, therefore,] can claim no
property rights in the funding for these [Abbs’ personally conceived and
personally authored research grants]”) (emphasis added).
165. Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at 1176 ( “[T]he University of WisconsinMadison . . . is the legal entity that applies for research grants.); see
Waldeman, supra note 69.
166. Abbs, 963 F.2d at 922 (emphasis added); Abbs, 756 F. Supp. at
1182-1183 (“As to current grants, he [Dr. Abbs] is not the grantee [University
of Wisconsin-Madison, Abb’s employer, the legal grantee] and [Dr. Abbs,
therefore,] can claim no property rights in the funding for these [Abbs’
personally conceived and personally authored research] grants”) (emphasis
added).
167. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1128-29 (citing Abraham Lincoln, Second
Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859), in 3 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356, 363 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)).
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(divulgation) rights, American research scientists often lack
standing to sue for non-economic intellectual rights in their
own research discoveries.
In the U.S., the percentage of independent inventors (those
who have not assigned their patent rights to an employer or
the government) is relatively low (about 25%); such
independent individuals are typically viewed negatively by
corporations, creating material pressure for a research scientist
to comply to gain or to retain employment.168 Consequently,
even in the 1980s, the majority of patents issued (84%) go to
corporations.169 This latter fact, presumed true, largely vitiates
the federal government’s rationale for technology transfer
legislation in 1980, Bayh-Dole, Stevenson-Wydler, in 1986 for
The Federal Technology Transfer Act, and PHS policy
mandating control by federal scientific research grantee
organizations.170
Like the U.S. in 1916,171 independent inventors tend to be
much higher in developing countries, about 66% in Brazil and
25-50% in European countries.172 In the U.S., then, the
majority, three-quarters (75%), of research scientist inventors
assign their ownership of their creative inventions to their
employers, usually as a mandate of their employment. This
situation results in business managers’ practical control of
scientific research, both science direction toward marketable
products as well as research disclosure, via peer-reviewed
168. MICHAEL GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGIES FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD 99 (2008) (citing WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROP. ORG. & INT’L FED’N OF INVENTORS’ ASS’NS, HOW CAN PATENT OFFICES
ENCOURAGE INVENTIVE AND INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES? (2000), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/innovation/en/wipo_ifia_bue.00/wipo_ifia_bu
e.11.doc; Farag Moussa, The Role of Innovation, INT’L FED’N OF INVENTORS’
ASS’N, http://www.invention-ifia.ch/role_of_innovation.htm (last visited July
17, 2012)).
169. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1129 n.9 (citing Rights of Employed
Inventors: Hearing on H.R. 4732 and H.R. 6635 Before the H. Subcomm. On
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 97th Cong. 1 (1982)
(remarks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier)) (stating that “[eighty-four] 84%
percent of U.S. patents go to corporate assignees, ‘usually the employer of the
actual inventor.’ As recently as 1916, three-quarters [75%] of the patents in
the United States were issued to individuals.”) (internal citations omitted).
170. See supra Part II.B.2.
171. Fisk, supra note 33, at 1129 n.9.
172. GOLLIN, supra note 168, at 99.
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scientific publications, upon which the scientists’ careers
depend (matters for which business managers are generally not
competent).173 Research scientists’ creativity is the foundation
173. Melese, supra note 5, at 17:
Moreover, there is an increased desire for companies to
engage in strategic research partnerships reflecting a
general trend for companies to move away from licensing
arrangements and toward building partnerships. . . . [M]ost
contract officers . . . that negotiate research and
collaborative agreements for acquiring technology resources
are commonly not trained to make science or business
decisions and are not experts in intellectual property.
Consequently, they lack the skills required to balance
science and intellectual property risk against the potential
benefits of a business opportunity.
Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 14:
The practice of biomedical research is changing. It is
evolving towards a bigger enterprise involving multiple
investigators from multiple institutions, both academic and
corporate. No single investigator can assemble all the
required technologies and expertise to understand complex
disease mechanisms and to translate that scientific
knowledge into disease treatment. To move discoveries
effectively between bench and bedside requires close ties
among
the
basic
[academic
fundamental
biological/biochemical
processes],
clinical
[patient
management], and corporate research enterprises.
Id. (citations omitted); Thomas J. Roberts & Jess House, Profile of a Research
Administrator, 15 RES. MGMT. REV., Winter/Spring 2006, at 41 (“The general
profile of a research administrator is: . . .bachelor’s degree . . . 6-10 years
[experience as research administrator].”); GOLLIN, supra note 168, at 120-21:
I [Gollin, Esq., IP Partner, Venable, LLP] have never met
anyone who is an expert in all three areas-creativity
(technology or art), (2) intellectual property law, and (3)
business. . . . Engineers and scientists engage in basic
research and product development, and operate in a
situation of high technical complexity[,] . . . high
information intensity[,] . . . [and] high aesthetic
sophistication. . . . They [research scientists] understand the
innovation and its relation to the state of the art. . . .
Unfortunately, senior managers in some organizations are
not proactive and [specifically scientifically] knowledgeable,
and may make unwise decisions about intellectual property
or otherwise thwart good work by [research scientists] staff-
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for the quality and quantity of marketable products; such U.S.
policies and statutes arguably remove control and exploitation
of scientific researchers’ intellectual endeavors and
accomplishments to business administrators least likely to
have the scientific acumen to further develop U.S. intellectual
property.174 In 1968 the executive branch commissioned a
report from Harbridge House, which reported commercial
utilization of government funded research was low.175 The
Harbridge report also found that “the evidence does not
indicate that either title or nonexclusive licensing [to the
employer] is uniformly the best way to promote utilization” of
academic research.176 The PHS policies of ownership by
grantees are inextricably intertwined by the dual justifications
of “policing” science misconduct and facilitating “technology
transfer,” both justifications having highly questionable merit
and questionable effectiveness in fact and in practice.177
investing unnecessarily to protect worthless projects, failing
to take measures necessary to protect valuable projects, or
structuring unworkable relationships with collaborators.
Id. (emphasis added).
174. Greenbaum, supra note 81, at 359:
More often than not, technology transfer offices drain
university resources, promising the sky but delivering little.
Further, they drain the resources and time of the
researchers who must cooperate with the TTOs [technology
transfer offices] to draft and license patents. With their
monopolistic hold on all licensing efforts in the university,
technology transfer offices may also inhibit many
entrepreneurial efforts by the researchers themselvesstunting the growth of a patent-friendly environment in
academia and hampering independent academia-industry
collaboration.
Id.
175. Id. at 338-39 nn.86, 90, 91 (citing ANDREW Z. MICHAELSON, THE LAW
LAB: USING ZERIT TO INFORM TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 21, 22 (2002),
available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/512/michaelson.pdf).
176. Id. at 339.
177. See, e.g., Dov Greenbaum, Research Fraud: Methods For Dealing
With An Issue That Negatively Impacts Society’s View of Science, 10 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 75 (2009) (“Has the prevalence of fraud in science
risen to problematic level? . . . [T]here is little in the way of hard empirical
data one way or the other.”).
OF THE
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The Courts’ Disagreement with Agencies’
Policies and Practice: Stanford v. Roche and
Bayh-Dole

Nonetheless, the PHS “default intellectual property
employer ownership policy” has neither been generally
embraced by the courts nor accepted in practice by the research
science community.178 In Forsham v. Harris, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that data developed under a federal grant did not
constitute an “agency record.”179 As previously noted, editors of
scientific journals solicit copyright transfer from individual
authors without requirement of institutional approval, an
indication that journal editors, as well as prior noted scientist
researchers, deem research scientist authors own copyright in
their own research, not their employers.180 In its June 6, 2011,
7:2 decision, Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford
University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed that “[t]he Bayh-Dole Act does not
automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in
federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take
title to such inventions.”181 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the
178. Id. at 74; see Bd. of Trs. Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188
(2011); see also Waldeman, supra note 70; Jackson & Khin-Maung-Gyi, supra
note 71.
179. 445 U.S. 169, 186-187 (1980) (internal citations omitted); see also
Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987); 23 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 2D, 203 § 18 (Westlaw 2010) (“the mere fact that an
invention was conceived and developed while the inventor was employed
entitles the employer to no right or title to the invention”) (emphasis in
original). However, once employer contribution has been established, the
existence of an employer’s right may be presumed; McKeen v. Jerdone, 34
App. D.C. 163, 6 (1909) (the employer has the burden of showing both that it
was aware of and communicated to the employee a specific means of
accomplishing the desired result, and that the employee's work consisted of
mere improvement that could have been carried out by any skilled
technician); Burton v. Burton Stock-Car Co., 171 Mass. 437, 50 N.E. 1029
(1898); Deane v. Hodge, 35 Minn. 146, 27 N.W. 917 (1886) (the employer has
the burden of proving that the employee intended to permit the employer to
make gratuitous use of the employee's invention). But see Pedersen v. Akona,
429 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143 (D. Minn. 2006) (finding implied-in-fact contract
and ‘shop right by estoppel’ of employer to use employee’s invention).
180. Jackson & Khin-Maung-Gyi, supra note 71, at 23.
181. Leland Stanford Univ., 131 S. Ct. at 2190 (citing University and
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majority:
Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the
premise that rights in an invention belong to the
inventor. [See, e.g,. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477,
493 (10 How. 1850).] The question here is
whether the University and Small Business
Patent Procedures Act of 1980-commonly
referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act-displaces that
norm and automatically vests title to federally
funded inventions in federal contractors. We hold
it does not.182 . . . [U]nless there is an agreement
to the contrary, an employer does not have rights
in an invention “which is the original conception
of the employee alone.”183
The Chief Justice further stated that:
Although much in intellectual property has
changed in the 220 years since the first Patent
Act, the basic idea that inventors have the right
to patent their inventions has not.184 . . . We have
rejected the idea that mere employment is
sufficient to vest title to an employee’s invention
in the employer.185
In Stanford, the Supreme Court strongly affirmed (7:2)
that, absent clear contractual waiver to the contrary, research
scientists both own and control research science they creatively
bring into being.186 It is too soon to anticipate what impact
Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 (Bayh-Doyle Act of 1980), Pub.
L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)) (BayhDole controls allocation of rights to inventions made by employees of small
business firms and domestic nonprofit organizations, including universities,
in federally assisted programs)) (quotation is found in the syllabus of the
opinion).
182. Id. at 2192 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 2195 (citation omitted).
184. Id. at 2194.
185. Id. at 2196 (emphasis added).
186. Id.
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Stanford will have on United States research science. However,
it seems clear that many federal agencies’ policies and practice,
prior reviewed herein, may require substantive revision in light
of the Stanford holding.
III. Why Is Absence of Moral Rights for Scientists a Problem:
Adverse Impact on Scientific Progress and Achievement
A. U.S. Agencies’ Policies Legal Deficiencies in General
In 2005, it was estimated there were at least fourteen (14)
U.S. federal agencies or departments that fund scientific
research.187 Some of these have established policies
implementing the Federal Policy on Research Misconduct
mandated by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (a
part of the executive branch of the U.S. government).”188 The
latter office, Office of Science and Technology Policy, of the
President established a “Uniform Policy for Research
Misconduct” with which individual agencies are to comply.189
Less than forty percent of U.S. federal agencies have drafted
science misconduct policies. Most existing science misconduct
policies provide very broad, general requirements in brief
statutory form. “The remainder [of the relevant federal
agencies] are either drafting policies or are in the process of
establishing policies through formal channels.”190 Agencies
having science misconduct guidelines include: Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS);191 Department of Defense
(DoD);192 Department of Energy (DoE);193 National Aeronautics
187. MACRINA, supra note 89, at 14-15.
188. Id.
189. Uniform Policy on Research Misconduct, Notification of Final
Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. No. 235, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,260 (Dec. 6, 2000).
190. MACRINA, supra note 89, at 14.
191. Public Health Services Policies on Research Misconduct, 42 C.F.R.
pts. 50, 93 (2011).
192. Research Integrity and Misconduct, DEP’T OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION
3210.7, at 1, 5 (2004), available at
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/321007p.pdf:
(a)DoD Directive 3216.2, “Protection of Human Subjects and
Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported
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and Space Administration (NASA).194 In 1995, the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) published a sixty eight
page booklet of guidelines and recommendations entitled,
“Integrity and Misconduct in Research.”195 In contrast to the
comparable ABA’s LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY is 1697 pages excluding
additional Index Tables.196 Scientific professional journals
occasionally publish review articles on science misconduct,
most highlighting the devastation to scientific careers and
reputation of both the scientists and their institutionemployers.197 One may reasonably conclude that professional
Research,” March 25, 2002
(b)Federal Register, Volume 65, page 76262, December 6,
2000, “Federal Policy on Research Misconduct” current
edition
(c)Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 22, “DoD
Grant and Agreement Regulations (DoDGARS),” current
edition
(d)Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 2,
“Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS),” current edition
(e)Section 2409 of title 10, United States Code, “Contractor
Employees: Protection from Reprisal for Disclosure of
Certain Information”
(f)Section 552 of title 5, United States Code, “Freedom of
Information Act”
(g)Section 552a of title 5, United States Code, “Privacy Act”
Id.
193. Interim Final Rule & Opportunity for Comments, Department of
Energy Policy on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 123 (proposed July 28,
2005) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 600, 733, 48 C.F.R. pts. 935, 952, 970).
194. Grant
and
Cooperative
Agreement
Handbook—Research
Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 96 (May 19, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts.
1260, 1273, 1274).
195. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COMM’N ON RESEARCH
INTEGRITY REPORT, INTEGRITY AND MISCONDUCT IN RESEARCH (1995)
[hereinafter RYAN REPORT], available at
http://ori.hhs.gov/documents/report_commission.pdf.
196. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS,
THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2012).
197. Rennie Drummond, Dealing with Research Misconduct in the
United Kingdom and An American Perspective of Research Integrity, 316
BRIT. MED. J. 1726-33 (1998); see also Herbert N. Nigg & Gabriela Radescu,
Science Misconduct in Environmental Science and Toxicology, 272 J. OF THE
AM. MED. ASS’N 168-70 (1994).
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ethical guidance for research scientists is fragmented between
governmental agencies, guidelines drawn using very broad
strokes; for the most part, lacking objective procedural process
and enforcement authority, comparable to the American
Medical Association or American Bar Association.198
Macrina aptly notes another common issue, that is, science
misconduct often does not occur in a vacuum.199 Science
misconduct is frequently accompanied by charges under
various civil and criminal laws.200 Scientific experts, specific to
the accused’s research specialty and without conflict of interest,
should be recruited to fully adjudicate offenses perpetrated by
the individual or group.201 The latter is rare given the ORI’s
mandate for institutions to “self-investigate” alleged science
misconduct of their own (to include institution administrators),
particularly if misconduct involves economic or commercial
matters of science germane to the institution’s functions.202

198. The “Ryan Report” recommendations for research misconduct are
not unchallenged in the scientific community. RYAN REPORT, supra note 195;
see, e.g., Debate, Should the Department of Health and Human Services Adopt
the Ryan Commission’s Recommendations? Pro and Con, CQ RESEARCHER
(Jan.
10,
1997),
available
at
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre199701100
0#Sidebar1REF[1]; Jennifer Kulynych, Intent to Deceive: Mental State and
Scienter in the New Uniform Federal Definition of Scientific Misconduct, 1998
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/kulynychintent-to-deceive.pdf (“The legal principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty,’
which might be rephrased, ‘assume correct until proven wrong,’ does not
apply to scientific work; the burden of proof remains with those claiming new
findings.”) (internal citation omitted); Jesse A. Goldner, The Unending Saga
of Legal Controls Over Scientific Misconduct: A Clash of Cultures Needing
Resolution 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 293 (1998).
199. See MACRINA, supra note 89, at 15.
200. Id.; see infra Section III.B. Criminal penalties for scientific research
disclosure or “export” of sensitive but unclassified research science, absent a
license to disclose, may include both incarceration and/or substantial fines.
201. Kulynych, supra note 198, at ¶¶ 48-49.
202. See, e.g.,United States v. Butler, 429 F.3d 140, 144-45 (5th Cir.
2005); see also Barbara E. Murray, Karl E. Andersen, Keith Arnold, John G.
Bartlett, Charles C. Carpenter, Stanley Falkow, J. Ted Hartman, Tom
Lehman, Ted W. Reid, Frank M. Ryburn, Jr., R. Bradley Sack, Marc J.
Struelens, Lowell S. Young & William B. Greenough III, Destroying the Life
and Career of a Valued Physician-Scientist Who Tried to Protect Us from
Plague: Was It Really Necessary?, 40 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1644-48,
1646
(2005),
available
at
http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/40/11/1644.full.pdf+html.
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Both the National Institutes of Health (NIH, United States
Public Health Service, USPHS) and National Science
Foundation (NSF) require all grantee institutions to have
infrastructure in place for dealing with scientific misconduct.203
When the economic or political stakes are sufficient, such legal
delegation for intramural misconduct investigation functions
tantamount to placing the “fox in charge of oversight of the
chicken coup” for the majority of grantee institution scientists
in both academic and government institutions.204 Appellate
process to the NIH, Office of Research Integrity (ORI), results
in formal extramural investigations less than ten percent of the
time despite apparent statutory mandate for federal funds
scientist recipients.205 The end result of this flawed system for
research science public disclosure is often: (i) frequent and
admitted denial of due process; (ii) forced retraction or
government denial of public disclosure against public interest;
(iii) arguable denial of First Amendment free speech; and, (iv)
given PHS policy for grantee institution ownership, lack of
standing for any impartial court challenge by the research
scientist.
Summarizing modern government conflation of economic
and security issues, the Association of American Universities
notes: “Export control laws, long a mechanism to control
transfer of goods having military applications, became [after
9/11 also] a means to limit export of goods or technologies
having commercial value. This dual focus contributes to some
of the difficulties experienced in university research
administration today.”206

203. MACRINA, supra note 89, at 15.
204. See, e.g., SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 60; CREWDSON, supra note 98,
at 294-95.
205. Annual Report, OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, http://ori.hhs.gov
(last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
206. Alice P. Gast, The Impact of Restricting Information Access on
Science and Technology 3 (2003) (emphasis in original), available at
http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=1602.
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B. Delayed or Denied Public Disclosure of Research Findings
Against Public Benefit
In a survey from 2001-2006, AAAS found that intellectual
property concerns significantly delayed, or precluded both
research advancement and research disclosure to the public
from government, nonprofit, healthcare, academic, industry
and business organizations.207 Research science disclosures, to
include intellectual property, perceived as implicating U.S.
national security are generally handled via “a complex
combination of statutes, regulations, and procedures that
govern control of classified information, public access to
governmental information, and maintenance of government
records.”208 Post-9/11, President George W. Bush “extended
classification authority to several departments and agencies
that had not previously been involved . . . e.g. the Department
of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Department of Health and Human Services.”209
Post-9/11 security restrictions on disclosure of federally
funded research were instituted under three new legal
doctrines: export restrictions, a term of art broadly including
any “sensitive” [research science] disclosure to any non-U.S.
citizen [latter, “deemed export”]; “unclassified but sensitive”
federal agencies’ policies determinations; “dual use” research
findings disclosure which may apply when basic life science
207. STEPHEN A. HANSEN, AMANDA BREWSTER, JANA ASHER & MICHAEL
KISIELEWSKI, THE EFFECTS OF PATENTING IN THE AAAS SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
8-9 (2d ed. 2006), available at
http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/AAAS_IP_Survey_Report.pdf.
208. GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 475-78, 475 n.1:
With two exceptions, the government has no authority to
designate information produced outside this legal
framework as classified. The first exception is through the
Atomic Energy Act; information related to nuclear weapons
may be “born classified” without any prior involvement of
the government in its generation. The second exception,
under the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, permits
information received as part of the patent-application
process to be classified.
Id.
209. Id. at 475.
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research findings may have alternative applied use; and
arguable self-censorship chilling by the scientific community
(e.g. peer-reviewed research science journal editors) for any
science deemed to have potential national security
implications.210
Detailed review of security issues is beyond the scope of
this review except as these may impact research science
intellectual rights of attribution, integrity, disclosure and
retraction. Research science security issues reflect the present
the national security environment, currently in flux in
response to rapidly changing global situations and executive
policy.211
210. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 96:
Until recently, there were very few cases of problems
related to the publication of research results in the life
sciences that attracted significant public attention. Some
specialists in bioterrorism, however, had warned that, given
continuing advances in biotechnology, open publication
could provide information of use to terrorists…The public
perception led to calls for scientific journals to refrain from
publishing “dangerous” research or to delete some data from
published research results in order to preclude others from
replicating the results . . . . In addition to the results of
fundamental research, the compilation, synthesis, and
assessment of already published results in review articles
may provide an understanding of a field that could guide or
assist terrorists. Even more difficult are the concerns raised
by reports that result when scientists are assembled to
render their judgment as experts about particular problems.
Id. (emphasis added). See generally NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2;
James B. Petro, Intelligence Support to the Life Science Community:
Mitigating Threats from Bioterrorism, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (June 26,
2008,
3:02
PM),
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no3/article06.html.
211. See, e.g., Research Compliance, supra note 16:
The U.S.A. Patriot Act and related legislation have altered
the landscape for research at U.S. universities. Driven by a
concern that research-generated information and materials
used in research experiments could be used by terrorists to
attack the American population, the Federal government
has extended its regulation of research activities at
universities and private laboratories. The effects of this new
regulatory regime will be felt especially by the biological
sciences, and some branches of chemistry, computer science,
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“Export Restrictions”: Publication, Peer-to-Peer
Communication, and Patent Secrecy Orders

Federal export restrictions may affect intellectual property
rights of U.S. scientists’ research disclosure, to include: peerreviewed journal publication; peer-review by U.S. scientists of
research by scientists in certain foreign countries; scientific
communication with research science colleagues in the U.S.
and overseas; collaborative research science with “foreign”
scientists to include naturalized U.S. university faculty and
students (under the “deemed exports” policy restriction);212 and
patent secrecy orders.213
a.

Export Controls

Export Controls control the flow of both information and
materials.214 Most, but not all, information subject to export
control is of United States origin, in whole or in part, and
proprietary.215 The Department of Commerce implements the
export information and materials licenses under the Export
Administration (Regulations) Act of 1979 (EAR).216 Information
and physics . . . . The regulatory atmosphere since 9/11
remains volatile and subject to change.
Id. (emphasis added).
212. JULIE NORRIS, ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS./COUNCIL ON GOV’T RELATIONS,
RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCH AWARDS: TROUBLESOME CLAUSES, available at
www.aau.edu/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=1634 (citing the text of the
laws, regulations and policies).
213. The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2006)
(implemented by 37 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2011)).
214. See GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31845,
“SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED” AND OTHER FEDERAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION: HISTORY AND CURRENT CONTROVERSY
3-6 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31845.pdf.
215. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 105 n.41.
216. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. Law 96-72, 93 Stat. 503
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app.) (amended by
International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No.
110-96, 121 Stat. 1011 (2007)). The Act lapsed on August 20, 2001 and the
President (George W. Bush), through Executive Order 13,222 of August 17,
2001 (66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (Aug. 22, 2001)), has continued the Regulations in
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 50 U.S.C. §
35 (2006). See also IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31832,
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and technical data export is also controlled by the Department
of State, under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR).217 The EAR defines “technical data” as:
Technology. (General Technology Note)—
Specific
information
necessary
for
the
“development”, “production”, or “use” of a
product. The information takes the form of
“technical data” or “technical assistance”.
Controlled “technology” is defined in the General
Technology Note and in the Commerce Control
List (Supplement No. [One] to part 774 of the
EAR).
N.B.: Technical assistance—May take forms
such as instruction, skills training, working
knowledge, consulting services.
Note: “Technical assistance” may involve
transfer of “technical data”.
Technical data —May take forms such as
blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae,
tables, engineering designs and specifications,
manuals and instructions written or recorded on
other media or devices such as disk, tape, readonly memories.218
In contrast to EAR,219 the 2011 ITAR definition of
“technical data” explicitly excludes “general scientific,
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT: EVOLUTION, PROVISIONS, AND DEBATE (2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL31832.pdf.
217. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130
(2011).
218. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2012) (emphasis added). The Commerce Control
List is part of the EAR, 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supplement No. 1-15, and is
available
at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html
and
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/ear_data.html. See generally IAN F.
FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31832, THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
ACT: EVOLUTION, PROVISIONS, AND DEBATE (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL31832.pdf.
219. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 105 n.41 (“Unlike the EAR [under
the ITAR], however, ‘publicly available scientific and technical information
and academic exchanges and information presented at scientific meetings are
not treated as controlled technical data.”).
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mathematical or engineering principles,”220 and information
within the “public domain,” (including newspapers,
subscriptions, library materials, patents, conferences, meetings
or seminars, released by government agency), or products of
“fundamental research. . .ordinarily published and shared
broadly in the scientific community.”221 The 2011 ITAR,
however, provides an exception to “fundamental research”
disclosure if: “(i) The University or its researchers accept other
restrictions on publication of scientific or technical information
resulting from the project or activity, or (ii) The research is
funded by the U.S. Government and specific access and
dissemination controls protecting information resulting from
the research are applicable.”222 Another exception to the
fundamental research “export exception” is fundamental
proprietary research, even if sponsored by private commercial
interests and conducted at public and private universities.223
Since fundamental research may not, at its onset, envision any
220. Technical Data, 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1)-(5) (2011).
(a) Technical data means, for purposes of this subchapter:
Technical data means, for purposes of this subchapter:
(1) Information, other than software as defined in §
120.10(a)(4), which is required for the design, development,
production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair,
testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles.
This includes information in the form of blueprints,
drawings,
photographs,
plans,
instructions
or
documentation.
(2) Classified information relating to defense articles and
defense services;
(3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order;
(4) Software as defined in § 121.8(f) of this subchapter
directly related to defense articles;
(5) This definition does not include information concerning
general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles
commonly taught in schools, colleges and universities or
information in the public domain as defined in § 120.11. It
also does not include basic marketing information on
function or purpose or general system descriptions of
defense articles.
Id. (emphasis added).
221. 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)(1)-(8) (2011).
222. Id. at § 120.11(a)(8) (emphasis added).
223. FINK REPORT, supra note 83.
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proprietary outcome, this exception is indeed problematic for
academic institutions’ export compliance. Exports, defined in
the ITAR, expressly includes any form of disclosure, “oral or
visual or transfer.”224
b.

“Deemed Exports”

Deemed exports are generally intangibles, broadly defined
as delivering information or allowing access or use of exportcontrolled components by non-U.S. persons within the U.S.,225
or abroad.226 Sensitive information subject to non-disclosure or
license to disclose includes information non-U.S. persons:
might be expected to take . . . with them in their
heads or personal notes when they leave the
United States at some future time, providing the
information or access to them was “deemed” to be
an export for regulatory purposes. In this way,
the reach of the [various federal agencies’ export
control] lists was extended to many activities
conducted entirely within the United States, and
not just to activities of exporting goods and
services.227
Deemed exports have their origin in The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,228 authorized by the
Inspectors General of the Departments of Commerce, Defense,
Energy, and State, in consultation with Directors of the CIA
(Central Intelligence Agency) and FBI (Federal Bureau of
Investigation), to conduct a multiyear assessment of the
224. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a) (2011).
225. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL, BEYOND FORTRESS
AMERICA: NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A
GLOBALIZED WORLD 22 nn.11, 32-33, Appendices F, H (2009).
226. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(4) (2011) (“(a) Export means: (4) Disclosing
(including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a foreign
person, whether in the United States or abroad.”).
227. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 3334.
228. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L.
106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999).

65

JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES

2012]

11/13/2012 9:03 AM

“BEYOND THE SCOPE”

741

adequacy of current controls and counterintelligence measures
to prevent acquisition of sensitive U.S. technology and
technical information by countries and entities.229 Many of
these agencies’ reports remain either classified or publicly
unavailable.230
In 2006, Arthur Bienenstock, Past-President of the
American Physical Society, Director of the Wallenburg
Research Link and professor at the Stanford Synchrotron
Radiation Laboratory [among his numerous titles], reviewed
the impact of the “deemed export” Policy on Stanford to the
Deemed Export Advisory Committee (DEAC), of the
Association of American Universities (AAU), concluding:
“negative consequences [of deemed export policies] for the
nation [are] far greater than positive.”231
229. Memorandum from Michael C. Kane, Assoc. Adm’r for Mgmt. and
Admin., to Alfred K. Walter, Acting Assistant Inspector Gen. for Inspections
and Special Inquiries, (Mar. 31, 2004), in OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND SPECIAL
INQUIRIES, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INSPECTION REPORT: CONTRACTOR
COMPLIANCE WITH DEEMED EXPORT CONTROLS 10-11 (2004), available at
http://energy.gov/ig/downloads/inspection-report-contractor-compliancedeemed-export-controls-doeig-0645:
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 requires that between 2000 and 2007[,] the President
shall submit to Congress and annual report to include a
review that examines export control issues by the Offices of
Inspector General (OIGs) of the Departments of Energy,
Commerce, State, and Defense. For 2004, the OIGs for these
agencies and the Department of Homeland Security and the
Central Intelligence Agency reviewed compliance by
contractors and universities with deemed export controls for
access to unclassified technologies. Release to a foreign
national of technology or software that is subject to the
Export Administration Regulations is "deemed to be an
export" to the home country of the foreign national. Release
includes visual access by foreign nationals to United Statesorigin equipment and facilities and oral exchange of
information.
Id.; COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 22 n.11.
230. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 22
n.11.
231. Arthur
Bienenstock
(Profile),
STANFORD
UNIV.,
http://fsi.stanford.edu/people/arthurbienenstock (last visited Apr. 12, 2012);
Arthur Bienenstock, Stanford Univ., Presentation to the Deemed Export
Advisory Committee: Deemed Exports: An Academic’s View (Jan. 22, 2006),
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In assessing the negative impact of “deemed exports,”
Professor Bienenstock noted that thirty three percent of
Stanford’s graduate students are non-U.S. from ninety four
foreign countries; that Stanford’s contracts and grants cannot
restrict publication nor limit participants in research based on
nationality, religion, gender, etc.; both faculty advisors and
students working on integrated research projects must have
access to confidential data to participate fully in the research;
and Department of Commerce must provide an accurate and
readily available list of technical manuals “not publicly

available at www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=1536 (follow
“Bienenstock Presentation at DEAC Meeting,” dated January 22, 2006).
Among the negative consequences of “deemed export controls” Bienenstock
listed are: foreign students treated as second-class on campus: readily
identifiable (badges, etc.), limited access to controlled instruments; will
discourage students from US universities; will discourage faculty with
controlled equipment from supervising foreign students; U.S. is dependent on
foreign students for its S & T (science and technology) workforce; students on
temporary visas earned about one-third (32%) of all S & E (science and
engineering) doctorates awarded in the U.S. in 2003; more than half (55%) of
engineering doctorates were awarded to students on temporary visas;
historically, half or more of students on temporary visas have stayed in the
United States immediately after degree conferral, with this percentage
increasing in recent years. See also Jacob N. Shapiro & David A. Siegel, Is
This Paper Dangerous? Balancing Secrecy and Openness in Counterterrorism,
19 SECURITY STUD. 66, 94, 98 (2010) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/publications/Is%20This%20Paper%20Dangero
us.pdf:
[Federal] officials do not generally believe changes in the
level of security have increased security. Sixty-seven
percent of our respondents report secrecy has increased
since 2000, and [thirty] percent report it has remained the
same. At the same time, [sixty] percent of our respondents
report that the changes in information control have had no
effect or a negative effect on the safety of society from
terrorism. This perception is not consistent with the
hypothesis that changes have been driven by a wellreasoned effort to increase security. . . . One federal official
neatly summarized a more nuanced approach: “Secrecy does
not necessarily increase security. Although it may deny
information to our adversaries, it also denies information to
those who need access; perhaps decreasing our ability to
protect ourselves; perhaps decreasing the level of trust our
citizens have in government.”
Id.(emphasis added).
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available,” subject to deemed export restriction [over 30,000
instruments at Stanford would need to be examined as possibly
deemed export-restricted].232
Deemed exports have been broadly defined to include
disclosure of materials and methods in peer-reviewed scientific
journal research articles; peer review of scientific research
manuscripts for peer-reviewed journal publication (to include
mere correction of faulty English grammar); peer review by
U.S. scientists of research by scientists in certain foreign
countries; scientific communication with research science peers
in the U.S. and overseas (for example, at seminars or scientific
meetings); collaborative scientific research with “foreign”
scientists to include naturalized U.S. university faculty and
students (under the “deemed exports” policy restriction).233 In
short, most activities intrinsic to scientific research, to include
all the most common forms of scientific disclosure, may be
deemed by one of several federal agencies’ various policies to
violate certain export restrictions.234
232. Presentation to the Deemed Export Advisory Committee: Deemed
Exports: An Academic’s View, supra 231; see also COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND
PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 32-37. The sharply rising Export
Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs, numbering close to 500 in 2008) are
taken from the annual editions of the Code of Federal Regulations: 15 C.F.R.
774 Supplement 1 (2011).
The relationship between the number of ECCNs and
number of controlled goods is neither direct nor proportional
and is influenced by several variables, including the breadth
of products and goods controlled and the list of destination
countries defined for each ECCN. The [Department of
Commerce] Control List (CCL) is not in fact an explicit list
of commercial items to be controlled and is instead a list of
technology descriptions that may qualify a product for
export [restriction]. A cross-reference between the ECCN
and common product types is included with the current
CCL, but it clearly states it is not an exhaustive list.
COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL., supra note 225, at 33 (emphasis
added).
233. NORRIS, supra note 212 (this AAU/COGR report cites the text of the
laws, regulations and policies).
234. COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY, supra note 225, at 32-37.
Our former unilateral strategy of containment and isolation
of our adversaries is, under current conditions, a self-
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Patent Secrecy Orders: The Invention Secrecy
Act of 1951235

The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 permits the federal
government to place “secrecy orders” on a patent application.236
The latter results in both restricted disclosure of the invention
and withholding the grant of the patent.237 There are several
types of secrecy orders, ranging lowest to highest, from
prohibitions on export (but allowing other “business purposes”
disclosure), to classification or prohibition of all disclosure.238
Since the Invention Secrecy Act’s effective date, invention
secrecy orders have steadily increased to a high of 5241 in
effect in FY (fiscal year) 2011.239 The Invention Secrecy Act is
not restricted to public interests in government inventions but
applies broadly also to private inventions which “might in the
opinion of the Commissioner of Patents, be detrimental to the

destructive strategy of obsolescence and declining economic
competitiveness. A strategy of international engagement is
a path to prosperity that can be coupled with a smart
approach to security using an adaptive system of
government regulation and incentives.
Id. at 81.
235. The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-256, 66 Stat. 3
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2006)).
236. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2006) provides that:
Whenever publication or disclosure by the publication of an
application or by the grant of a patent on an invention in
which the Government has a property interest might, in the
opinion of the head of the interested Government agency, be
detrimental to the national security, the Commissioner of
Patents upon being so notified shall order that the invention
be kept secret and shall withhold the publication of the
application or the grant of a patent therefore under the
conditions set forth hereinafter.
Id.
237. Id.
238. See generally STEVEN AFTERGOOD, FED. OF AM. SCIENTISTS,
INVENTION SECRECY (2011), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/index.html (contains cross-links to
official government documents’ references).
239. Id.
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national security.”240
The Invention Secrecy Act limits a secrecy order time
period to a period of one year, but provides for additional
renewal of secrecy status “for additional periods of one year
upon notification by the head of the department or the chief
officer of the agency who caused the order to be issued.”241
There are substantial penalties for the inventor who discloses
by publication or by filing overseas in violation of a secrecy
order, including the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office holding
the patent “abandoned”; “a forfeiture by the applicant, his
successors, assigns, or legal representatives, or anyone in
privity with him or them of all claims”;242 and possible criminal
penalties.243
2.

“Sensitive but Unclassified” (“Controlled Unclassified
Information”): Executive Agency and/or Academic
Institution Publication Preclusion

Albeit not defined in statutory law,244 “Sensitive But
Unclassified” information, or SBU, was technically defined in
2009 “to refer collectively to [the approximately 117]
designations used within the Federal Government for
documents and information that are sufficiently sensitive to
warrant some level of protection, but do not meet the standards
for National Security Classification.”245 “Controlled But
Unclassified Information,” or CUI, was defined as:
A category designation that refers to unclassified
information that does not meet the standards for
National Security Classification under Executive
Order 12,958, as amended, but is (i) pertinent to

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2006).
Id. at § 181.
Id. at § 182.
See id. at § 186.
KNEZO, supra note 214, at 2.
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO.,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 n.2, 33-34 (2009) (SBU definition given on
first page and“SBU Markings Currently in Use” in Appendix), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/cui_task_force_rpt.pdf (last visited July 12, 2012).
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the national interests of the United States or to
the important interests of entities outside the
Federal Government, and (ii) under law or policy
requires protection from unauthorized disclosure,
special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits
on exchange or dissemination.246
Publication restrictions precluding research science
disclosure based on increasing government classification and
non-classified denial of disclosure predate 9/11.247 While
detailed information security history is beyond the scope of this
review, a brief security history overview is material to the
current status of attribution, integrity, retraction, and
disclosure intellectual rights restrictions pertaining to U.S.
scientific research.248
President Ronald Reagan’s Executive Order 12,356, signed
by the President on April 2, 1982, greatly broadened authority
to classify information.249 As previously discussed, however,
President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 189,
National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and
Engineering Information, ostensibly remains in force post9/11:250
246. Id. at1 n.2
247. See Austin Harris, Square Information, Round Characterization:
Executive Order 13,556 and Its Implementation Challenges, 1 UNIV. MIAMI
NAT’L. SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 150, 158-61 (2010-2011); see also
KNEZO, supra note 214.
248. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245, at 6-7 n.12; see KEVIN R.
KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 97-771, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION POLICY
AND PROCEDURE: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/97-771.pdf.
249. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874, 14,875 (1982):
If there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify
information, it shall be safeguarded as if it were classified
pending a determination by an original classification
authority . . . . If there is reasonable doubt about the
appropriate level of classification, it shall be safeguarded at
the higher level of classification . . . .
Id.; see also National Security Information, 47 Fed Reg. 27,836 (June 25,
1982) (to be codified at 32 CFR pt. 2001).
250. GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 104-06 (“The NSDD-189 policy
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It is the policy of this Administration that, to the
maximum extent possible, the products of
fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is
also the policy of this Administration that, where
the national security requires control, the
mechanism for control of information generated
during federally-funded fundamental research in
science, technology and engineering at colleges,
universities and laboratories is classification.
Each federal government agency is responsible
for: a) determining whether classification is
appropriate prior to the award of a research
grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if
so, controlling the research results through
standard classification procedures; b) periodically
reviewing all research grants, contracts, or
cooperative
agreements
for
potential
classification. No restrictions may be placed upon
the conduct or reporting of federally-funded
fundamental research that has not received
national security classification, except as
provided in applicable U.S. Statutes.251
Post-9/11, the freedom to publish scientific research often
seems to turn on each agency’s interpretation of whether
science research is “fundamental research,”252 rather than on
remains in force and has been reaffirmed by senior officials [Condoleeza Rice]
of the [then] current [George W. Bush] administration, but it appears to be at
odds with other policy developments and some recent practices.”).
251. National Security Decision Directive 189 (Sep. 21, 1985), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm (emphasis added).
252. See, e.g., Letter from John J. Young, Dir., Def. Contract Audit
Agency, to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’t (June 26, 2006), available at
http://www.ogrd.wsu.edu/documents/DOD.pdf.
This
letter
defines
“fundamental research” as follows:
“Fundamental research” means basic and applied research
in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily
are published and shared broadly within the scientific
community, as distinguished from proprietary research and
from industrial development, design, production, and
product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are
restricted for proprietary or national security reasons . . . .
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whether “research that has not received a national security
classification.”253
The definition of "contracted fundamental research" in a
DoD grant or contractual context is established by
References (a) and (b) and is defined as follows:
"'Contracted Fundamental Research' includes research
performed under grants and contracts that are (a) funded by
budget Category 6.1 ("Research"), whether performed by
universities or industry or (b) funded by budget Category
6.2 ("Exploratory Development") and performed on-campus
at a university. The research shall not be considered
fundamental in those rare and exceptional circumstances
where the 6.2 funded effort presents a high likelihood of
disclosing performance characteristics of military systems
or manufacturing technologies that are unique and critical
to defense, and where agreement on restrictions have been
recorded in the contract or grant."
The terms "budget category 6.1" ("Research") and "budget
category 6.2" ("Exploratory Development") have been
replaced by Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
Budget Activity 1 (Basic Research) and 2 (Applied
Research). With this clarification, these references continue
to define national and DoD policy on the transfer [including
publication] of the products of contracted fundamental
research.
Id. See generally KNEZO, supra note 214 (There appears to be lack of
consensus whether SBU should be classified; and whether SBU controls
adversely affect scientific communication.).
253. KNEZO, supra note 214, at 1; see also Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement, DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information, PGI
204(3)(ii), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/changenotice/2008/20080721/pgichanges-07212008.pdf:
(i) NSDD 189 establishes a national policy that, to the
maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental
research shall remain unrestricted. NSDD 189 provides that
no restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or reporting
of federally funded fundamental research that has not
received national security classification, except as provided
in applicable U.S. statutes. As a result, contracts confined to
the performance of unclassified fundamental research
generally do not involve any export-controlled items,
information, or technology.
(ii) NSDD 189 does not take precedence over statutes.
NSDD 189 does not exempt any research, whether basic,
fundamental, or applied, from statutes that apply to export
controls such as the Arms Export Control Act, the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, or the U.S.
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Restriction on disclosure, to include research science, may
be divided into two broad categories: classified, denoted by the
government with specific markings; and unclassified, which
includes about 117 “ad hoc, agency-specific” subtypes, defined
by individual agencies’ policies.254 It is the latter, most often
restricting modern U.S. research science disclosure, i.e. the
broad category designated either as: “unclassified but
sensitive” (“UBS”), or “Controlled Unclassified Information”
(“CUI”).255 Modern CUI/UBS may include, but is not limited to,
such executive agency “inefficient, confusing patchwork”256 as:
“attorney client, IT [Information Technology] security-related,
trade secret [and other intellectual research science property],
bomb tech sensitive, controlled nuclear information, chemicalterrorism
vulnerability
information,
and
protected
infrastructure information.”257 It is the ad hoc agency-specific
denial of research science disclosure invoking UBS or CUI
restriction blamed for harm to U.S. research innovation,
particularly post-9/11.258
In Executive Order 13,526, dated December 29, 2009,

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or the
regulations that implement those statutes (the ITAR and
the EAR). Thus, if export-controlled items, information, or
technology is used to conduct research, the export control
laws and regulations apply to the controlled items,
information, or technology.
Id.
254. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245, at app. 2, 33-34; see also
Harris, supra note 247, at 157.
255. Harris, supra note 247, at 158-61. Federal employee job
performance rating for conformance with CUI Framework policies may be a
material factor promoting research science disclosure self-censorship or
“chilling” factor; see also PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245, at 23-24.
256. Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675 (Nov. 4, 2010).
257. Harris, supra note 247, at 158 (internal citations omitted); see also
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245.
258. Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675, § 1 (Nov. 4, 2010)
(“This inefficient, confusing patchwork has resulted in inconsistent markings
and safeguarding of documents, led to unclear or unnecessarily restrictive
dissemination policies, and created impediments to authorized information
sharing. The fact that these agency-specific policies are often hidden from
public view only aggravated these issues.”) (emphasis added). See generally
GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 70, 83-84, 104-05, 186-92; REVISITED
STORM, supra note 21.
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President Barack Obama revoked prior more restrictive
executive orders regarding national security information.259
Executive Order 13,526 does not specifically address
“unclassified but sensitive” scientific research. In Executive
Order 13,556 of November 4, 2010, President Obama recently
addressed the research science publication problem of the nonclassified publication preclusion, i.e. “Controlled Unclassified
Information.”260 It is too soon after the 2009-2010 executive
policy changes to evaluate the impact on U.S. scientific
research innovation, the latter severely harmed by post-9/11
disclosure restrictions.261

259. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009):
Section 1.1 Classification Standards
(b) If there is significant doubt about the need to classify
information, it shall not be classified . . . .
Sec. 1.5 Duration of Classification
(d) No information may remain classified indefinitely . . . .
Sec. 1.7 Classification Prohibitions and Limitations
(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related
to the national security shall not be classified . . . .
Sec. 1.8 Classification Changes
(c) Documents required to be submitted for prepublication
review or other administrative process pursuant to an
approved nondisclosure agreement are not covered by this
section [Classification Challenges].
Id.
260. Exec. Order No. 13,556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675, § 1 (Nov. 4, 2010); see
also Harris, supra note 247.
261. EXEC. AGENCY, CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION (CUI)
OFFICE NOTICE 2011-01: INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE FOR EXECUTIVE
ORDER 13,556 (2011), available at www.archives.gov/cui/.../2011-cuio-notice2011-01-initial-guidance.pdf; see also CUI Chronology, CONTROLLED
UNCLASSIFIED INFO., http:/www.archives.gov/cui/chronology.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2012) (“[I]n May 2008, the Archivist of the United States established
the CUI Office within NARA [National Archives and Records] to act as the
CUI Executive Agent (EA).”). See generally GATHERING STORM, supra note 21,
at 70, 83-84, 104-105, 186-192; REVISITED STORM, supra note 21; COMM. ON
SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY, supra note 225; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra
note 245.
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“Dual Use”: When Basic Life Sciences Research May
Have Applied Use

“Dual use” has been defined as scientific research that has
both civil and military applications and is subject to one or
more agencies’ policy control regimes.262 The Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) within the Department of
Commerce is charged with regulating dual use exports.263 The
BIS licensing is accomplished in consultation with, e.g. review
by Defense Technology Security Agency in the Department of
Defense, and referral by Depart of State.264 For research
scientists, “dual use” is a broad and ill-defined research
category,265 admittedly failing to reflect advances in technology,
and failing to reflect foreign availability of dual use items.266
Shared responsibility for dual use determination further
creates uncertainty as to which agency controls licensing
determination.267 Finally, research scientists and research
organizations may not appeal denial, because there is no
judicial review of licensing decisions.268

262. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 105; see also NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH, OFFICE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES, NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR
BIOSECURITY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS No. 14 [hereinafter NSABB],
available
at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/ibc/FAQs/FAQs%20about%20the%20National%20Sc
ience%20Advisory%20Board%20for%20Biosecurity.pdf:
The NSABB has proposed defining “dual use research of
concern” as research that, based on current understanding,
can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge,
products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by
others to pose a threat to public health, agriculture, plants,
animals, the environment or materiel. The NSABB has also
proposed a series of experimental outcomes that should be
given special consideration for their dual use potential.
Id. (emphasis added).
263. FERGUSSON, supra note 216, at 26.
264. Id.
265. NSABB, supra note 262, at No. 14.
266. FERGUSSON, supra note 216, at 26.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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“Self Censorship Chilling” by Peer Reviewed Journal
Editors of Scientific Findings Deemed to Pose
Potential Security Risk by Disclosure

Self-regulation of “sensitive” research science disclosure
post-9/11 was initially based on the 1970s 3-prong model for
self-regulation of recombinant DNA research:
(1) personal responsibility and accountability
of the researcher to conduct his or her research
safely;
(2) deliberations by a nationally convened
advisory group to provide recommendations
regarding biosafety with recombinant DNA
research; and
(3) local oversight by the institution through
a committee of peer researchers and biosafety
professionals to assure that appropriate
facilities, practices, personnel, and training were
in place.269 Post-9/11, the National Academies of
Sciences
published
findings
and
recommendations of the 2003 “Fink Report,”
after the committee chairman, Gerald Fink.270
The 2004 Fink Report advocated “expanded selfgovernance by researchers toward issues of biosecurity, as well
as the formation of a national advisory board to help guide both
the government and research community in addressing issues
involving dual use.” 271 The National Science Advisory Board on
Biosecurity, NSABB, was chartered by the Executive Office of
the President [George W. Bush] and became fully operational
in 2005.272 Currently, the mandate of the NSABB, located
269. NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 59-60 (“Although all these
[3-prong model] components of self-governance and local assurance were
recommended for all U.S. researchers regardless of affiliation, the practical
outcome of this system is that only institutions accepting federal funding for
DNA research are obligated to use this model of oversight.”).
270. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 115.
271. NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP, supra note 2, at 60.
272. Id. at 60-61.
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within the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Office of the
Director NIH, Office of Biotechnology Activities, has been
restricted to “oversight of dual use biological research,”273 and a
limited renewable charter of two-year intervals.274 The NSABB
mandate has been increasingly narrowed in scope from that
initially proposed in the “Fink Report” of 2004.275
The Fink Report also recommended peer-reviewed science
journals “refrain from publishing ‘dangerous’ research or delete
some data [to include materials and methods] from published
research results in order to preclude others from replicating
the results.” 276 The Fink Report further broadly recommended
virtually every aspect of research science disclosure be
subjected to restriction:
In addition to the results of fundamental
research, the compilation, synthesis, and
assessment of already published results in review
articles may provide an understanding of a field
that could guide or assist terrorists. Even more
difficult are concerns raised by reports that
result when scientists are assembled [e.g. at
professional scientific society meetings] to render
their judgment as experts about particular
problems, even when they rely completely on

273. NSABB, supra note 262, at No. 14.
The NSABB has proposed defining “dual use research of
concern” as research that, based on current understanding,
can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge,
products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied
by others to pose a threat to public health, agriculture,
plants, animals, the environment or materiel. The NSABB
has also proposed a series of experimental outcomes that
should be given special consideration for their dual use
potential.
Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.; see also FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 95 (The NSABB
meeting pertains to “insider threats at facilities that conduct research with
highly pathogenic agents”).
276. FINK REPORT, supra note 83, at 96.
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open sources of information.277
Professional peer-reviewed journals’ responses to the Fink
Report recommendations appear guardedly negative. For the
eleven journals it publishes, the American Society for
Microbiology (ASM) rejected restriction on material and
methods information section of peer reviewed research
articles.278 The ASM did institute formal procedures as part of
the peer-review process to allow reviewers to “address potential
risks of the research results to national security.” 279 Other
science peer-reviewed journals have also “moved to develop [a
security] review procedure of their own.” 280
An executive agency, Department of Defense (hereinafter,
DoD), proposed in 2002 “that researchers be required ‘to obtain
DoD approval to discuss or publish findings of all militarysponsored unclassified research.’”281 The scientific research
community response severely criticized the latter DoD proposal
prompting DoD withdrawal.282 Department of Defense 5230.27
and 5230.29, affirmed on May 2010 and January 2009,
respectively, reflect ostensible intent to adhere to the principle
of public access to unclassified government research, while
apparently retaining [by reference] prior agency policies and/or
processes, restricting unclassified science disclosure.283 The
277. Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 97.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 101 n.1.
282. Id.
283. Presentation of DoD-Related Scientific and Technical Papers at
Meetings, Instruction 5230.27 (Dep’t of Def. Oct. 6, 1987) (affirmed May 24,
2010), available at http://www.ogrd.wsu.edu/documents/DOD.pdf; Security
and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release, Instruction 5230.29
(Dep’t
of
Def.
Jan.
8,
2009),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/523029p.pdf; see also NORRIS,
supra note 212; KNEZO, supra note 214, at 47:
[T]he Depart of Defense reportedly plans to reissue its
guidelines relating to pre-publication review of extramural
research it funds outside of its own laboratories. Recently
several university groups wrote a letter to the Director of
the Office of Science and Technology Policy complaining
that more agency program officials are inserting pre-
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federal agencies push for—with unquestionable push backresistance of the research community–to allow “voluntary” or
federal research support “contract clauses” to limit open and
full scientific disclosure continue post-9/11 and to the profound
detriment of U.S. research innovation.284
Continually-shifting policies regarding science disclosure
post 9/11, coupled with the vague broad definitions of
“fundamental” and “unclassified sensitive” research science,
have served to profoundly “chill” science innovation and to
discourage scientists from the pursuit of research affected by
U.S.
government
nondisclosure
policies
mandated
nondisclosure .285

publication review clauses into contracts, including
fundamental research, without explanation as to their
justification. This has “pernicious effects,” they said, “not
only with regard to the freedom to publish but also with
regard to employment of foreign-born students and
researchers on the federally funded research projects.”
Id.
284. Instruction 5230.27, supra note 283; Instruction 5230.29, supra
note 283; NORRIS, supra note 212; KNEZO, supra note 214, at 47; see also
REVISITED STORM, supra note 21; COMM. ON SCI., SEC., AND PROSPERITY ET AL.,
supra note 225; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 245; Simoncelli &
Stanley, supra note 82, at 33 (“[N]o administration should use its power to
censor, obstruct, tamper with of distort the findings of scientists to fit its
political agenda. Federal science-based agencies must retain the capacity to
carry out independent scientific research and should not be subjected to
political influence in establishing peer-review standards.”). See generally
GATHERING STORM, supra note 21, at 70, 83-84, 104-05, 186-92.
285. DoD 5230.27 , supra note 283; DoD Instruction 5230.29, supra note
283; NORRIS, supra note 212; KNEZO, supra note 214, at 47; SIMONCELLI &
STANLEY, supra note 82, at 33.
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C. Constitutional and Federal Law: U.S. Moral Rights Denial
Creates Legal Anomalies and Apparent Conflict of Law
Regarding Intellectual Property Created by Research
Scientists
1.

U.S. Government and Industry Practice Appears to
Violate Scientists’ First Amendment Rights and
Article I, § 8, cl. 8, and May Place Scientists in
Potential Catch-22 Situation: Either to Violate
Professional Ethical Standards or to Abruptly
Foreclose Employment

There is no copyright in works of the United States.286
“[C]opyright law prohibits any copyright in works of the U.S.
government.”287 One reason given for the prohibiton is the
concern for government censorship of information in violation
of the First Amendment.288 Professor Pollack argues that the
founding fathers intended the Constitution’s art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8,
copyright and patent provisions to be read in pari materia with
the First Amendment.289 The copyright clause when so read,
would equate “progress” with “dissemination” and could have
no potential to support censorship because “Congress was
empowered only to enact copyright statutes that disseminated
knowledge.” 290 Restriction on research a scientist’s First
Amendment disclosure for the public benefit may also be
limited by commercial sources providing scientific research
support.291
286. 17 U.S.C. § 101(iii)(C) (2006).
287. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:54 (2009) (“Current
copyright law prohibits any copyright in works of the U.S. government (a
defined term). The origin of this prohibition may be traced back to the 19th
century, when both statutory and judicial opinions began to shape the area.”);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 101(iii)(C).
288. Malla Pollack, The Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the
Modern First Amendment and the Original Progress Clause (A.K.A. Copyright
and Patent Clause) 45 JURIMETRICS J. 24, 45 (2004).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 30.
291. Melese, supra note 5, at 15 (“[T]he high costs and risks associated
with discovering and bringing a new drug to market and the potential
financial rewards for doing so encourage pharmaceutical companies to retain,
sequester, and control enabling intellectual property.”).
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One familiar challenge for federal scientists occurs when
the scientist’s research findings contradict a strongly held
position of senior supervisors, who may include political
appointees.292 Professional ethical standards expressly require
the scientist to “give the decision-maker a frank,
understandable description of the science.”293 However, such
situations often in fact place the government researcher in the
position of acquiescing in clear professional breach of research
integrity (e.g. knowing fraudulent distortion of research record
in acquiescence to a superior’s order).294 Any knowing
distortion of the research record (even to placate a supervisor)
if/when revealed would terminate the scientist’s career in
disgrace or, depending on source of research support, could
subject him to devastating “science misconduct” action.295 The
alternative, is the scientist immediately quits his/her job to
foreclose the scientist’s supervisor-coerced participation in
knowing scientific fraud.296
Modern research networks linking federal government and
292. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 41-43:
In recent years, the federal national laboratories have been
subject to reviews which have recommended reduction in
size, narrowing scope, and, in some cases, closing. These
pressures, not common in academia, lead to implicit and
sometimes explicit demands of loyalty to the organization.
One pressure can be less-than-objective regarding results
which may go against the desires of the leaders or funders
of the organization….A more difficult challenge comes when
a scientist’s position, based on his or her research,
contradicts a strongly held position of senior political
appointees. These situations, while perhaps rare, can place
the government researcher in a dilemma: acquiesce or leave.
Id.; see, e.g., MARK BOWEN, CENSORING SCIENCE, INSIDE THE POLITICAL ATTACK
DR. JAMES HANSEN AND THE TRUTH OF GLOBAL WARMING (2008) (detailing
the James Hansen case).
293. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 41-43.
294. Id. at 42-43.
295. See SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 10
(Applying any or all of the DHHS, NAS, NSF, Commission on Research
Integrity, and Medical Res. Council-England definitions of “misconduct in
science,” a scientist‘s distortion of the research record, even under
supervisor’s order, could render the scientist subject to misconduct charges.)
296. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 41-46;
see BOWEN, supra note 292.
ON
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industry with academic science research have brought
restrictions
on
publication
that
are
arguably
unconstitutional.297 Corporate and/or agency support may
similarly come with implicit or mandated restriction that only
scientific research findings furthering private or executive
agency interest be disclosed.298 This latter restriction directly
impacts research science quality and integrity via corporate or
government agency preclusion against disclosure limited to
research findings favorable to corporate-, or business- with
agency collaborative interest, a process arguably risking First
Amendment challenge as a prior restraint299 against the public
interest.
The Commission on Research Integrity proposed definition
of research misconduct would preclude any
significant
appropriates
contributions

behavior
that
improperly
the intellectual property or
of others, that intentionally

297. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24 , at 50; see
also Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Whistle-blowers’ Experiences in Fraud
Litigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies with Supplemental Appendix,
NEW ENG. J. MED., May 13, 2010,at 1832, 1839 (a study of “relators” in qui
tam suits filed under the Federal False Claims Act).
298. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 50:
The increasing involvement of industry, through grants and
other support, has been encouraged by universities. While
financially advantageous, and bringing faculty into contact
with practical problems, these industrial links have brought
restrictions on publication and other challenges to academic
freedom. An early proponent has cautioned that “the price of
corporate support is eternal vigilance.”
Id.
299. See generally IOANNIS G. DIMITRAKOPOULOS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: THE CASE LAW OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 531-32 (2007) (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550
(1993)) ([“The term prior restraint is used] . . .’ to describe administrative and
judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of
the time that such communications are to occur.’”); see also Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (“[A non-criminal prior restraint upon
expression] . . .’avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system.’”).
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impedes the progress of research, or risks
corrupting the research record or compromising
the integrity of research practices. Such
behaviors are unethical and unacceptable in
proposing, conducting, or reporting research, or
in [peer] reviewing the proposals and research
reports of others.300
However, the PHS policy of asserting institutional control
over intellectual property of research scientists working under
federal grants as property of the grantee institution, and not
the research scientist creator-inventor, arguably facilitates the
sort of detrimental restrictive disclosure that the policy was
supposed to prevent.
The latter DHHS research misconduct definition in accord
with 42 C.F.R. §§ 50 and 93 appears to preclude both the latter
government and commercial industry practices, posing
material risk to distort or preclude science disclosure. While
distortion of and preclusion of research science disclosure,
violate scientific research professional ethical standards,
published policy of DHHS, and international law’s droit moral
doctrine re science authors, arguably against public benefit,
currently there exists no direct or explicit private cause of
action for such science misconduct in the United States.301
David Nimmer, citing St. Onge’s definition of plagiarism,302
sums this situation as follows:
Plagiarism is an intentional fraud committed by
the psychologically competent that consists of
copying significant and substantial uncredited
written materials for unearned advantages with
no significant enhancement of materials copied.
That definition does not purport to set forth the
elements for a tort at law. Rather, it expresses
300. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 10
(quoting RYAN REPORT, supra note 195).
301. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 76-77 n.453.
302. ONGE, supra note 22, at 39 (“[A]cademic plagiarism is a capital
offense, punishable by academic death for student or faculty. With or without
warnings.”).
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“house rules” that certain guilds –notably
academics [to include research scientists]-but
other domains as well. . .have accepted upon
themselves. Those who cross the line risk not
liability in court to the general public, but rather
being defrocked from the particular priesthood
which maintains its special rules. . ..even there,
it is only the extreme case. . .that will lose her
job (although one who habitually cribs from
other’s writings may, over time, develop a
deserved reputation for academic shoddiness).303
The message from Nimmer is clear: absent inalienable
moral rights to attribution, integrity, and first disclosure
(which confer standing), there exists no recognized cause of
action in fact under law for research science misconduct
plagiarism, or right to attribution for actual authors. 304
2.

U.S. Work Made for Hire (Copyright)

In the U.S.A., under the “work made for hire doctrine” of
the 1976 Act, the employer is considered the author of an
employee’s creative work.305 The latter doctrine distinguishes
303. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 69-70 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
304. Id.
305. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a)-(b) (2006). Section 101 states:
A “work of the United States Government” is a work
prepared by an officer or employee of the United States
Government as part of that person’s official duties. A “work
made for hire” is (1) a work prepared by an employee within
the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work,…if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire. 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a)-(b)
provide: (a) Initial Ownership. Copyright in a work
protected under this title vests initially in the author or
authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are
coowners of copyright in the work. (b) Works Made for Hire.
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
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the U.S.A., from every other nation, because the U.S.A.’s “work
for hire” doctrine effectively grants the “whole bundle of sticks”
of intellectual property rights (all moral and all economic
rights) of an employee’s creation to the employer.306 The
Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104(c) expressly precludes
expansion or reduction of either Title 17 or common law rights
in reliance on the provisions of the Berne Convention.
However, the 1976 Copyright Act significantly modified the
definition of “work made for hire” to modify or eliminate the
presumption of the 1909 Act favoring rights in the employers.
The changes, however, will not be applied retroactively.307
Whether a person is an employee for purposes of 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 of the 1976 U.S. Act is determined by principles of the
common law of agency.308
A work made for hire is defined in 17
U.S.C. § 101 of the 1976 U.S. Act as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment; or

author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed
by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
(emphasis added).
Id.
306. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1209; Dennis Angel & Samuel W.
Tannenbaum, Works Made for Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209,
210-11 (“An established principle of both common law and statutory
copyright in the United States is the presumption that the copyright in the
work produced by an employee in the course of his employment vests in his
employer. By securing copyright in a work, the employer acquires all rights
under the Copyright Act.”) (citations omitted).
307. See Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 961 (1983) (retroactive application of the 1976 Act’s “work made for
hire” to pre-1978 transactions would raise a due process violation and be a
taking of property [from the employer] without just compensation); see also 1
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.11 (2012) (Retroactive application
of the 1976 Act, effective January 1, 1978, would be a violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and a violation of the Fifth Amendment
limitation on the federal government’s right to take private property for
public use absent just compensation).
308. See 18 C.J.S. Copyrights § 23 (2011).
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(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for
use as;
(i) a contribution to a collective work;
(ii) part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work;
(iii) a translation;
(iv) a supplementary work (i.e. a work for
publication as a secondary adjunct to a
work by another author, the term being
fully defined in the Act);
(v) a compilation;
(vi) an instructional text (term defined in
the section);
(vii) a test;
(viii) answer material for a test; or
(ix) an atlas,
if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire.309
The 17 U.S.C. §102(2) is silent on the issue of whether
there must be a pre-creation writing for assignment of
copyright. Consequently, courts are split.310 Once a work is
309. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1253.
310. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the writing must precede the creation of the work);
see also Armento v. Laser Image, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 719, 750 (W.D.N.C. 1996)
(requiring the explicit words, “work made for hire”), aff’d, 134 F.3d 362 (4th
Cir. 1998). But see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 560 (2d Cir.
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presumed “made for hire,” the burden shifts so that only a
written agreement signed by both parties will rebut the
assignment of rights to the employer, and even then only the
rights are reassigned; the employer is still considered “the
author.” 311
In contrast to the United States of America, if assignment
of employee rights to an employer is permitted, most civil law
nations both limit the category of employer (e.g. broadcasters,
motion picture producers, computer programs) to those
specifically involved in commercial works involving collective
endeavors, and also narrowly define rights granted such
employers to less than all property rights.312
The USA “work for hire doctrine” is arguably inherently in
conflict with: (i) the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’
preclusion of government takings of private property for public
use without just compensation;313 (ii) 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) which
forbids “involuntary transfer;” 314 (iii) international treaties
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1010 (1995) (post-creation writing acceptable
when confirms prior agreement oral or implied).
311. Mark L. Meyer, To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts: The Protection of and Rights in Scientific Research, 39 IDEA 1, 5 n.24
(1998) (citing Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 306, at 209, 210 n.5 (1976)).
312. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1209.
313. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall…be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
314. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2006) states:
When an individual author’s ownership of copyright, or of
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not been
previously transferred voluntarily by that individual
author, no action by any governmental body or other official
or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or
exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or
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binding the U.S.A. as federal law;315 (iv) research science
professional and regulatory “science misconduct” ethical
restrictions on authorship to natural authors;316 and (v)
subsequent patent prerequisites for proof of patent inventor
and priority in written works.317
Such plain language conflicts of intellectual property law
as applied to research science and research scientists would not
exist but for U.S.A.’s exclusion of research scientists from
moral rights of attribution and integrity, accorded visual and
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given
effect under this title, except as provided under title 11.
[Title 11 of the United States Code is entitled
“Bankruptcy.”]
Id. (emphasis added).
315. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, UN.
Doc. A/RES/810 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made,
or which shall be made, under authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
of every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added). The U.N. Charter, a self-executing treaty, would
preempt state laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, which gives treaties
the same status as federal law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
if viewed as an extension of the U.N. Charter, would grant individuals
progressive economic, cultural and social rights (e.g. potential for U.S.
economic liability under federal law). See also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD
MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 172, 174 (2001).
316. SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 10
(citing RYAN REPORT, supra note 195, at 15).
317. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV :
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
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phonographic artists.318 Professor Kwall summed the U.S.
current position in refusal to recognize moral rights:
The existence of more substantive moral rights
protections in both civil and common law
jurisdictions not only creates a disparity between
the law in the United States and other countries,
but also results in situations in which American
authors find substantially more protection for
violations of their moral rights abroad than at
home.319
The latter situation, United States research science lack of
moral rights recognition in law for research scientists, is
deemed one, if not the, fundamental factor for current
American innovation decline, i.e. lack of talent in the U.S.A.,
and not merely lower operating cost outside the U.S.320

318. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 24-25.
319. KWALL, supra note 30, at 37 (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
320. See STORM REVISITED, supra note 21, at 46:
Turning to research and development [R&D]-where the
United States ranks eighth among nations on a per-GDP
[gross domestic product] basis-government investment has
declined from two-thirds of the nation’s total expenditure to
less than one-third. Over half of the United States federal R
& D spending is defense-related. China has a relatively low
R&D to GDP ratio-but has more than doubled the figure
over the past decade, even while growing its GDP
substantially. Viewing such trends United States research
universities are increasingly creating ties to what they view
as the more highly regarded overseas universities. . . .
United States industrial firms are increasingly adopting
much the same strategy, building new research facilities
outside the country. Although this was initially driven by
the lower cost of operations abroad, it now is often motivated
by the relative availability of talent. The National Science
Foundation reports that U.S.-based companies now have
[twenty-three] percent of their R&D employment located
abroad.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Intrinsic Conflict of Law Between Title 17 and Title 35
for Scientific Research Progressing from Unpublishedto-Patent

In research science creative sequence, copyright normally
precedes a patent filing on the subject matter of an invention.
Unlike copyright in the U.S.A., however, irrespective of
ownership assignment, a patent by law must be filed and issue
only in the actual inventor’s name, and not the name of a
potential assignee of patent rights, e.g. an employer.321
The patent attribution standard, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and
102(f), limit to the natural person inventor, is a higher
standard than that allowed under copyright to authors under
title 17 (17 U.S.C.), particularly that given in the “work for
hire” doctrine. Assuming initial copyright authorship were
assigned to an employer under “work for hire,” the required
priority evidentiary proof of first conception and reduction to
practice, then, is unlikely to reflect the natural person
inventor. Such a scenario via work for hire would break a
scientist’s attribution to his creation during the research
sequence from unpublished labnotes-to-patent-to-manuscriptpublication legally would preclude patent protection. Patent
321. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (essential to prove “known or used” actual
inventor’s patent priority); 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006) (patent may be filed only
in name of actual inventor.); see also Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 40 F. 3d 1223, 1230-31 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“That is not to say, however,
that the NIH scientists [defendant-employer] merely acted ’as a pair of hands’
[testing the new anti-HIV/AIDS drug, azidothymidine (AZT)] for the
Burroughs Welcome inventors…[E]nabling disclosure does suffice in this case
to confirm the inventors [BW] had concluded the mental part of the inventive
process-that they had arrived at the final, definite idea of their inventions
[before committing to NIH investigators’ AZT efficacy testing], leaving only
the task of reduction to practice to bring the inventions to fruition…the NIH
scientists were not joint inventors of these inventions.”). The recent patent
reform act, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, passed by the
Senate on September 8, 2011, signed into law by President Obama on
September 16, 2011, broadens filing to allow filing by the employer or
assignee of the actual inventor. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Various changes in patent law implemented
by provisions of the America Invents Act, will take effect on differing dates.
America Invents Act: Effective Dates, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/aia-effective-dates.pdf. The
details for implementation of the America Invents Act are being formulated,
so are outside the time scope of this review.
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priority in the U.S.A. is determined by “first to conceive.” 322
First conceptions, typically unpublished but copyrighted by
fixation in a tangible medium of expression, logically precede
“reduction to practice of the operative invention.”323
Were in arguendo the conception and reduction to practice
research sequence steps assigned via work for hire authorship
to an employer, any resultant inventive product or process
should be legally precluded patent protection by 35 U.S.C. §
102(a) & (f), requiring the actual inventor-creator be named
inventor on the patent. In contrast, given accord with Berne
art. 6 bis, UDHR art. 27, International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) art. 15, intellectual
property rights granted to the scientist continuously remain
attributed to the actual scientist creator-inventor during the
entire research-to-product or research to–process sequence so
no conflict of title 17 and title 35 would exist.324
4.

Patent “Shop Right,” Employer Paid-Up Use License
vs. Patent Work Made for Hire, Employer Ownership

Under common law, absent agreement to the contrary, the
inventor-employee owns the right to an invention even if
conceived during the course of employment.325
Work for hire theory provides at least three exceptions to
the latter rule:
(1) an express agreement assigning employee inventions
to the employer exists;
(2) an implied agreement is found because:

322. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (f) (2006); see 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Among its
many new provisions, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 11229, § 3(b), passed by the Senate on September 8, 2011, signed into law by
President Barak Obama on September 16, 2011, changes U.S. patent law
from a “first to invent” to a “first to file,” thereby harmonizing U.S. patent
law with the global majority. See also Glenn Hess, Senate to Revisit Patent
Reform, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Sept. 5, 2011, at 44, 44-46 (2011).
323. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (f) (2006).
324. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1248, 1267.
325. KATHLEEN L. DAERR-BANNON, CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE
PREINVENTION ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENTS, CAUSES OF ACTION 2d § 269 (2010)
(citing Univ. Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 (E.D. Pa.
1991)).
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(a) employee was “hired to invent;”326
(b) employee was tasked to solve a specific problem;327
(c)
employee served in a fiduciary capacity to the
328
employer.
326. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Akona, LLC, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1141 (D.
Minn. 2006) (discussing the test to determine whether an employee is “hired
to invent”):
Although there is a presumption that an inventor owns his
invention, “employers may still claim employee’s inventive
work where the employer specifically hires or directs the
employee to exercise inventive faculties.” . . . “When the
purpose for employment thus focuses on invention, the
employee has received full compensation for his or her
inventive work.” . . . To apply the hired-to-invent doctrine, a
court must “examine the employment relationship at the
time of the inventive work to determine if the parties
entered into an implied-in-fact contract to assign patent
rights.” . . . “[S]tate contract principles provide the rules for
identifying and enforcing implied-in-fact contracts.”… “The
implied-in-fact contract to assign inventive rights is a
question of fact.”
Id.
327. See, e.g., McKeen v. Jerdone, 34 App. D.C. 163, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1909)
(citing Robinson v. McCormick, 29 App. D.C. 98, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1907))
(provides the test (“beyond the scope of ordinary training and knowledge”) for
distinguishing when an employee or his employer is entitled to patent
claim(s) as inventor based on alleged input from the employer):
It is a well-established principle of the patent law that
where an inventor [employer] employs another to embody
his conception in a drawing or in a practical form, he is
entitled to any improvement thereon due to the mechanical
skill of the employee….But while an employer is to be
protected from bad faith of his employee, the employee is
equally entitled to protection from his employer. If,
therefore, he goes further than mechanical skill enables him
to do and makes an actual invention, he is entitled to its
benefit. “To claim the benefit of the employee’s skill and
achievement, it is not sufficient that the employer had in
mind a desired result, and employed one to devise means for
its accomplishment. He must show that he had an idea of
the means to accomplish the particular result, which he
communicated to the employee in such detail as to enable
the latter to embody the same in practical form.”
McKeen, 34 App. D.C. at 172 (quoting Robinson, 29 App. D.C. at 109).
328. B. Jean Weidemier, Ownership of University Inventions: Practical
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Where no contractual agreement, express or implied exists,
shop right may operate to grant an employer a royalty-free
license to use the employee’s patent, when the invention was
made with the employer’s resources or facilities.329
a.

Patent “Shop Right,” Employer Paid-Up Use
License

Unlike copyright work for hire doctrine, the patent “shop
right” grants the employer only limited rights in an employee’s
invention. Shop right was defined as the non-exclusive right to
practice any invention made by an employee; patent title still
remains with the employee.330
Shop right is not a statutory right, but rather a form of
implied license, a common law right, determined by the court
factual analysis of equitable principles, an employer may to
freely use the subject of a patent if an employee uses his
Considerations, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL
INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES, ch. 5.4, 495-505, 495 (Anatole
Krattiger, Richard T. Mahoney, Lita Nelsen, Jennifer A. Thomson, Alan B.
Bennett, Kanikaram Satyanarayana, Gregory D. Graff, Carlos Fernandez &
Stanley P. Kowalski eds. 2006).
329. Id. at 495.
330. C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Application and Effect of “Shop Right
Rule” or License Giving Employer Limited Rights in Employees’ Inventions
and Discoveries, 61 A.L.R. 2d 356, § 6[b] (2010) (citing Consol. Vultee Aircraft
Corp. v. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc., 204 F.2d 946, 950 n.1 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied 346 U.S. 873 (1953)); see also Stanley P. Kowalski, Making the Most of
Intellectual Property: Developing and Institutional Policy, in 1 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST
PRACTICES, ch. 5.3, 485-94, supra note 328:
A shop right is an “implied-in-law nonexclusive license of a
patent from an employee to an employer. A shop right is
generally implied when an employee who is not specifically
hired to invent uses the employer’s facilities to invent,
usually while on the job. The shop right rule grants to such
an employer the royalty-free right to use the invention of
the employee. It is based on the employer’s presumed
contribution to the invention through materials, time, and
equipment.”
Id. (emphasis added). See generally C.C. BJORKLUND, EMPLOYEE’S RIGHT TO
COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYER’S USE OF EMPLOYEE’S INVENTIVE IDEA, 23 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d § 203 (2010).
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employer’s time, money, tools and materials to produce a useful
result.331 Shop right is distinct from an express license, the
latter given by consent of the parties, whereas a shop right is
created by operation of law.332
b.

Patent Work Made for Hire, Employer
Ownership

In contrast to shop right, work for hire operates to divest
the employee-inventor of patent title, based on the three
common law exceptions prior noted.333 Albeit no state has yet
adopted a similar position, federal law mandates that the
federal employee-inventor divested of his patent rights under
work for hire be afforded a minimum 15% of any royalties or
income received by the U.S. government.334 The current state
[non-federal]335 majority view is given in the Utah statute
331. Drechsler, supra note 330, at § 18.
332. Id.
333. Weidemier, supra note 328, at 495.
334. The Uniform Patent Policy for Rights in Inventions Made by
Government Employees, 37 C.F.R. §§ 501.1-501.10 (2011), is applied in
tandem with the Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (2006),
which established a minimum compensation scheme, fifteen percent of any
royalties or income received, for inventors employed by the U.S. government.
15 U.S.C.A. § 3710(d) (2006) further “requires a government agency to allow
the inventor to retain title to any covered invention when the agency does not
intend to file a patent application or otherwise promote commercialization.”
See also DAERR-BANNON, supra note 325, at subsec. 5.
335. W.W. Allen, Annotation, Comment Note.-Rights and Remedies
(Independently of Patent Laws) of One who Makes an Invention or Discovery,
or Conceives an Idea or Plan, as Against One who Utilizes It Commercially, or
Discloses It, or Threatens to Do So, 170 A.L.R. 449 (2011) (citing Becher v.
Contoure Laboratories, 29 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1928), aff’d 279 U.S. 388, 390, 391
(1929)):
A suit in respect of wrongful manufacture, use, or disclosure
of a secret invention, discovery, process, etc., being founded
in the common law, or the ordinary equity jurisdiction, and
not on the patent laws, may of course be maintained in a
state court. Such a suit is not affected by the collateral
circumstance that plaintiff has filed an application for a
patent, nor by the granting of a patent to plaintiff
subsequently to the matter complained of.
Allen, supra note 335, at § II.
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regarding employer’s rights to employee-inventor’s patents.336
The Utah statute “clearly states the employer’s right to require
preinvention agreements as a condition of employment or the
continuation of employment, making it clear that adequate
consideration
from
employment-based
inventions
is
employment or continuation of employment in the at will
situation.” 337 Thus state court majority, in upholding employer
preinvention patent assignment agreement on a take-it-orleave-it-basis allows the employer to avoid difficult contract
questions re “adhesion and unconscionability, adequacy of
consideration, freedom of contract, and structural difficulties
implicit in ex ante bargaining for speculative rights.” 338
A recent case DDB Technologies v. MLB Advanced Media
L.P, has further defined “work for hire.” 339 On appeal, the
336. DAERR-BANNON, supra note 325, at subsec. 5.
337. Id.
338. Id. at subsec. 7.
339. DDB Tech., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media L.P., 517 F.3d 1284
(Fed. Cir. 2008), remanded to 676 F. Supp. 2d 519 (W.D. Tex 2009), denying
leave to appeal, Misc. No. 925, 2010 WL 675689 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 2010)
(employer’s legal title to employee’s invention depends on whether
employment agreement states that employee assigned future inventions or
merely agreed to assign future inventions); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Leland
Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2192
(2011) (holding: “The patent law has operated on the premise that rights in
an invention belong to the inventor.” The Bayh-Dole Act does not
automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors
or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions.)
At that time [1988], patent law appears to have long
specified that a patent assignment of future inventions . . .
conveyed equitable, but not, legal title. See, e.g., CURTIS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §§
170, 155 (3d ed. 1867) (“A contract to convey a future
invention… cannot alone authorize a patent to be taken by
the party in whose favor such a contract was intended to
operate”); Comment, Contract Rights as Commercial
Security: Present and Future Intangibles, 67 YALE L.J. 847,
854 n.27 (1958) (“The rule generally applicable grants
equitable enforcement to an assignment of an expectancy
but demands a further act, either reduction to possession or
further assignment of the right when it comes into
existence”). (Breyer, J. and Ginsburg, J. dissenting)
Id. at 2203. See also Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[o]nce the invention is made and [the] application for [a]
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Federal Circuit addressed two issues: (1) whether the patent
assignment clause created an automatic assignment or merely
an obligation to assign; and (ii) whether the patents fell within
the scope of employee’s employment agreement. As to the first
issue the Court held federal (not state contract) law applied.340
Under federal law, a patent assignment is automatic by
operation of law when it expressly grants rights in future
inventions and requires no further act on the part of the
assignee to complete the transfer.341 Alternatively, contracts
merely obligating an inventor to grant rights in the future may
vest equitable rights to the employer, but do not by themselves
vest legal title to the patents on those inventions.342 Therefore,
despite the assignment language, the employee would still need
to transfer legal title to his employer in an invention developed
after a general assignment of “future rights.”343

patent is filed,…legal title to the rights accruing thereunder would be in the
assignee [words: “do hereby [post-invention] assign”]…, and the assignorinventor would have nothing remaining to assign.”); Ipventure, Inc. v. Prostar
Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that an agreement to
assign future patent rights is not a present assignment, as would be
indicated by present assignment language, “hereby conveys, transfers,
assigns.”).
340. DDB Tech., 517 F.3d at 1296; see also DAERR-BANNON, supra note
325, at subsec. 3:
Federal law determines how a patent is transferred, but
state law governs the agreements to assign patents and
state law governs preinvention agreements. With their
origins in equity and in common law, such contracts:
(i) usually are, but need not be, in writing;
(ii) may be express, or within reasonable limitations, may be
implied in fact.
DAERR-BANNON, supra note 325, at subsec. 3.
341. DDB Tech., 517 F.3d at 1290.
342. Id.
343. See Brian Brunsvold & John C. Paul, Recent U.S. Decisions and
Developments Affecting Licensing, 43 LES NOUVELLES: J. OF THE LICENSING
EXECUTIVE SOC’Y INT’L 144, 145-46 (2008).
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Lanham Act Sec. 43(a) Reverse Passing Off Cause of
Action Reasonably Foreclosed After Dastar

In the United States, a common law country, copyright
protects economic rights in a creator’s work, and on its face the
Act is silent regarding the actual author’s attribution or other
moral rights.344 The United States became a party to the Berne
International Copyright Convention, effective 1989, absent
acceptance of its Art. 6bis moral rights, which would have
given U.S. authors attribution rights under federal law under
the Berne Implementation Act of 1988.345 Hence, although with
widely varying measures of success, numerous cases by actual
authors to vindicate attribution in their works have been
brought under Lanham Trademark Act’s sec. 43(a) “proscribing
344. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United
States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and [Lanham] Section
43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 997 (2002). But see Chloe v. Fordham Univ. Sch.
of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44 (1995) (holding that the Berne Convention is not selfexecuting, and cannot be used to support a separate copyright claim [author’s
claim of “mutilation” of his writing] outside of the rights accorded by domestic
U.S. copyright law.)
345. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 22-23 n.119 (2004):
[P]rotection of moral rights in the United States was
significantly at odds with moral rights enforced in countries
that incorporate Article 6bis into their domestic laws in
haec verba. At the outset, all U.S. creators working in an
employment relationship will, on account of that
employment status, be most challenged to vindicate, under
copyright law, any of the quasi moral rights [of attribution,
integrity, retraction, and disclosure]…Ineligibility for
employees to assert moral rights in their creations “ is
doubtless a legal position which is incompatible with the
protection provided for under Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention.” …American law as of 1989 recognized the
artist’s right to object to “derogatory action in relation to”
his work. Moreover, the fact that the United States
subsequently implemented moral rights legislationexpressly limited to the very narrow category of works of
visual art, and subject to innumerable exceptions even in
that field-merely highlights the contrast between our system
and that of other Berne states [nation states], whose moral
rights apply across almost all categories of copyrightable
works.
Id. (emphasis added).
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‘false designations of origin’” and “false descriptions or
representations in connection with any goods or services.”346
The 2003 landmark case of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp is widely believed to have proscribed
further reverse passing off cause of action for actual authors’
attribution rights under Lanham 43(a).347 In Dastar, the Court
346. Kwall, supra note 344, at 988 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006)). As
amended via the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, § 1125(a) provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name or symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which(A)
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of
his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial
activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
347. 539 U.S. 23 (2003) stating:
In sum, reading the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham
Act in accordance with the Act’s common-law foundations
(which were not designed to protect originality or
creativity), and in light of the copyright and patent laws
(which were), we conclude that the phrase refers to the
producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and
not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication
embodied in those goods. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 202(distinguishing
between a copyrighted work and “any material object in
which the work is embodied”). To hold otherwise would be
akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual
patent and copyright, which Congress may not do. See
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003).
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. (emphasis in original). See Graeme W. Austin, The
Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights After Dastar, 61
N.Y.U.
ANN.
SURVEY
AM.
L.
111
(2005),
available
at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals
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noted that Dastar copied film in the public domain, then
manufactured and sold the video set as its own product with no
mention of the original television series edited to comprise
Dastar’s video set.348 The Supreme Court held that “as used in
the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is in our view
incapable of connecting the person or entity that originated the
ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.” 349
Pre-Dastar, Lanham § 43(a) was touted as a legal option to
address lack of attribution or plagiarism, now considered
practically foreclosed.350
IV. Research Science Moral Rights: What Should Be Done
A. Federal Law Should Recognize Research Scientists’ Moral
Rights of Attribution, Integrity, Retraction and Disclosure
as Inalienable and Distinct from Associated Economic
Rights
1.

U.S. Obligations to Research Scientists Under
Treaties: Enforceable Under Article VI, cl. 2 of the
U.S. Constitution as Federal Law

The authority for both copyright and patent law in the
United States arises under the U.S. Constitution: “[The
Congress shall have the power] [t]o promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and the [u]seful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”351 Read literally, and in accord with
__annual_survey_of_american_law/documents/documents/ecm_pro_064627.p
df (arguing in favor of U.S. adherence to Berne Art. 6bis under Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804), requiring courts to interpret
statutes consistently with both customary international law and treaties).
348. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 38-40.
349. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32.
350. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 30-44.
351. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also DUTFIELD &
SUTHERSANEN, supra note 25, at 100-01 nn.41-42 (2008) (emphasis added)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed. 1961)):
The utility of [the copyright] power will scarcely be

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/3

100

JACKSONMACRO 99 PAGES

776

11/13/2012 9:03 AM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

the framers’ intent and historic application to early U.S.
research science authors and inventors, the Constitution
appears to grant intellectual property rights to natural
persons, the actual creators of scientific intellectual property.352
The classic constitutional definition of an author is “he to
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who
completes a work of science or literature.”353
Increasingly relevant for modern global research
endeavors, Article VI, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution accords
treaties of which the U.S. is party the status of federal law—
”the supreme law of the land.” 354 Modern research science
intellectual property is, by the very nature of global
investigative teams, often outside the sole jurisdiction of any
one nation state and requires coordination of national courts.355

questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly
adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong
to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases
with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately
make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of
them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws
passed at the instance of Congress.
Id. (emphasis added). See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE 59-77, 78151 (2002) (Review of intellectual property law history, reflecting England’s
influence on early U.S. law to accord the actual author(s) and –inventor(s)
legal rights to their work); Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929).
352. U.S. CONST.. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note
351, at 271-72.
353. 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 4:2 (2011) (citing
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884)). In BurrowGiles, the Court defined an author as one who “involves originating, making,
producing, as the inventive master mind, the thing to be protected . . . the
author is the man who really represents, creates, or gives effect to the idea,
fancy, or imagination.” Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61.
354. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”)
355. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 1, at 6 (“The internationalist perspective
also requires the Principles to envision a future in which coordination among
[nation states’] courts evolves from the exceptional to the expected”).
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Authorship Attribution to Natural Person
Creator: An Implicit Human Moral Right

International treaties and declarations to which the
United States is a party, when read in pari materia to the U.S.
Constitution and federal law, appear in accord with the
interpretation that natural person creators are the primary
focus of legal intellectual property rights.356 Professor Davies
summarizes the purpose of copyright as follows:
The copyright system guarantees the personal
interests of the author in his work. It is also
what Macaulay described as the “least
objectionable” way of remunerating men of
letters by providing mechanisms for authors and
other rights owners to obtain economic rewards
for their efforts. By securing such financial
rewards, it stimulates creativity, thereby in the
words of the Statute of Anne encouraging
“learned men to compose and write useful books,”
and in the modern world. . .promoting the widest
possible availability of copyright protected
material to the public, thereby encouraging both
learning and the progress of science.357
These treaties appear to imply moral rights, droit moral;
namely that an actual author who invests time in creating the
work also grants certain rights unique to creators.358 Berne
does not specifically define “author;” however, the Convention’s
text and historic context suggest “author” and “authorship”
were meant to be defined as the “natural person who created
the work.”359 The rule that the natural person who created the

356.
357.
358.
359.

DAVIES, supra note 29, at 235.
Id.
DUTFIELD & SUTHERSANEN, supra note 25, at 90-91.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW, & PRACTICE 245 (2010) ((quoting S. Ricketson, The 1992
Horace S. Manges Lecture — People or Machines: The Berne Convention and
the Changing Concept of Authorship, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1,
21(1991)).
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work is the original owner is known as the “creator doctrine.”360
The creator doctrine is the doctrine followed by the global
majority, including most civil law countries.361 In marked
contrast to civil law countries, common law countries (e.g. the
U.S.A. and U.K.) broaden the definition of author to include not
only the individual, but also a legal person such as a corporate
body.362
Moral rights theories may be broadly divided into three
categories: monist, dualist and reverse dualist (based on how
the rights are enforced).363 Germany represents a monist
theory, in which the personal element of a work, as an
extension of the creator’s personality, may not usually (unless
specifically waived) allow alienability of either moral or
economic rights to a work.364 In contrast, the French dualist
law considers moral and economic rights theoretically separate,
and moral rights are considered to protect personal interests in
a work apart from the work’s value.365 Distinguished markedly
from monists and dualists, common law countries’ (e.g. U.K.
and U.S.A.) reverse monist theory views works only in
economic terms, enabling full alienability to deem non-natural
creators the “authors” (e.g. employers, businesses, etc.) and
granting only limited time monopoly.366 Default authorship, by
virtue of the mere act of hiring the actual author-creator, is
directly contrary to the research science requirement to
attribute works only to the true authors.367 Attribution to the
natural person author ensures proper attribution and personal
accountability, positive or negative depending on science
findings’ merit, to the actual creator, both taken together to
promote scientific integrity.368
Professor Belanger argues that U.S. federal copyright law
“fails to meet the Berne Convention standards” for protection of
360. Id. at 245.
361. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1209.
362. Id.
363. Thierry Joffrain, Note, Deriving a (Moral) Right for Creators, 36
TEX. INT’L L. J. 735, 756-57 (2001).
364. Id. at 756.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 757.
367. Id. at 768-70.
368. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 22, at 74.
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moral rights in: (i) Section 106(A) applies only to works of
visual art, as opposed to all literary [including scientific] and
artistic works; (ii) Section 106(A) only provides the rights of
attribution and integrity, as opposed to full rights of respect
[faithful reproduction, rights of pseudonymity and anonymity],
and Section 106(A) allows for waiver of moral rights, a concept
outside of Berne.369
b.

Absence of Clear Legal Cause of Action or
Adequate Remedies for Research Science
Plagiarism

Moral rights are distinct from and broader than
copyright.370 Rights norms and professional research science
ethical mandates of research scientists and professional science
research associations absolutely require attribution.371 In the
United States, research science attribution and integrity
violations are rarely prosecuted or enforced, except as applied
to research misconduct actions.372 Federal government funding
agencies often enforce research misconduct primarily to recoup
federal research grant funds from an awardee committing
fraud.373 While most research scientists feel very strongly that
federal law should allow courts to review science misconduct
plagiarism and fraud,374 some judges and federal grant agency
369. William Belanger, U.S. Compliance With the Berne Convention, 3
GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 373, 399 (1995); see also Natalie C. Suhl, Moral
Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convention: A
Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203 (2002).
370. KWALL, supra note 30, at 55-57.
371. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93 (2011) (detailing U.S. federal grant
funded research attribution requirements); see also SIGMA XI, HONOR IN
SCIENCE, supra note 24, at 39 (in illustrating the research scientists’
professional ethical requirements, the authors state that “[t]ruthfulness may
or may not be the cement that holds together society as a whole, but certainly
it is essential to science.”) (emphasis added); SIGMA XI, THE RESPONSIBLE
RESEARCHER, supra note 24, at 55 (“Experimental results are property that
someone owns. The ownership of ideas is important; it has a bearing on
promotion, and ideas [patents] sometimes can be sold for profit. Conflicts of
interest exist.”).
372. See, e.g., SARASOHN, supra note 96, at 60-62; CREWDSON, supra note,
98, at 294-95.
373. 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93 (2011).
374. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 76-77 n.453 (citing Roberta Kwall, Moral
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officials embrace David Nimmer’s opinion that: “rather than
altering the laws passed by Congress or state legislatures, the
answer should be internal to the academic setting by the
adoption of appropriate university policies, ratified by their
respective academic senates, for application to professors and
students alike.” 375 Disadvantage of the latter court deference
to internal agency- or internal institution self-investigation for
the plaintiff research scientist, whose research has been
misappropriated, or otherwise subjected to integrity trespass or
disclosure denial outside science merit, is the practical problem
of conflict of interest of self-investigation, e.g. “the [agency] fox
guarding the henhouse” denial of due process or any impartial
investigative process.376 The current legal situation in the
United States for research science places the U.S. in the
unenviable position of a dwindling minority of developed
countries regarding its research science attribution and
integrity policies and practice.377 As will be discussed in greater
Rights for University Employees and Students: Can Educational Institutions
Do Better Than The U.S. Copyright Law?, 27 J.C. & U.L. 53,55 (2000)).
375. Nimmer, supra note 22, at 76-77 n.453.
376. See, e.g., Jackson v. McHugh, 131 S. Ct. 280 (2010), cert. denied,
Jackson v. Geren, 325 Fed. Appx. 213 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’g No. AW-07-851,
2008 WL 7728654 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2008); see Robert A. Gorman, Copyright
Conflicts on the University Campus: The First Annual Christopher A. Meyer
Memorial Lecture, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 291, 303 (2000) (“Were the
university to own the copyright in faculty-created works, the university can
block publication, can decide where and when to place the professor’s work
for publication, and can abridge, revise and delete as it chooses.”).
377. KWALL, supra note 30, at 37 (citing Nimmer, supra note 22, at 1920) (raising the question whether countries like England “have augmented
their moral rights protection” since the United States joined the Berne
Convention in 1988 “in a way that leaves the United States isolated”):
As the close of the First decade of the twenty-first century,
the United States appears to be rather isolated in its failure
to recognize explicitly adequate moral rights. The existence
of more substantive moral rights protections in both civil
and common law jurisdictions not only creates a disparity
between law in the United States and many other countries,
but also results in the situation in which American authors
find substantially more protection for violations of their
moral rights abroad than at home. ).
Id.; see also Cyrill Rigamonte, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L.
L.J. 353, 354 (2006) (“the adoption of civil-law style moral rights legislation is
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detail in subsequent sections, the result of the United States’
current failure to recognize in law the natural person research
scientist’s basic attribution, disclosure, retraction, and
integrity moral rights to his work is arguably unconstitutional
and against public interest.378
c.

Authorship Under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) Art. 27 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Art. 15 Binds the
U.S. via the UN Charter

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which
Eleanor Roosevelt was a key proponent, provides in Article 27:
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate
in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the
arts and to share in scientific advancement and
its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which
he is the author.379
The ICESCR imposes three obligations on member States:
a major shift in terms of copyright theory, because it eliminates the key
features that distinguished common law from civil law copyright systems”).
378. KWALL, supra note 30, at 37; U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
379. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art.
27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . .
.”) (emphasis added). The U.N. Charter, a self-executing treaty, would
preempt state laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, which gives treaties
the same status as federal law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
if viewed as an extension of the U.N. Charter, would grant individuals
progressive economic, cultural and social rights (e.g. potential for U.S.
economic liability under federal law); GLENDON, supra note 315, at 172, 174.
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to respect, to protect and to fulfill. 380 Although the U.S. signed
the ICESCR in 1979, it has not been ratified.381 However, the
ICESCR Article 15 simply reiterates UDHR Article 27, so the
U.S. may be bound via the U.N. Charter as previously noted.382
Under the U.N. Charter incorporating the UDHR and ICESCR
principles, the United States is bound to enforce human rights
for research scientists implicitly, if not directly, mandating
certain fundamental moral rights.383
380. MAREE SAINSBURY, MORAL RIGHTS AND THEIR APPLICATION IN
AUSTRALIA 16 n.75 (2003) (internal citations omitted) (“The objective of this
meeting was to elaborate on the Limburg Principles as regards the nature
and scope of violations of economic, social and cultural rights and appropriate
responses and remedies.”).
381. KWALL, supra note 30, at 134 n.15.
382. International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
art. 15, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of moral and material
interest resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is an author.
2.
The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right
shall include those necessary for the conservation, the
development and diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake
to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research
and creative activity.
Id. (emphasis added).
383. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
UNITED STATES, Introductory Note (1987):

OF THE

Virtually all states are members of the United Nations and
parties to its charter. . . . In Articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter, all member “pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with [United Nations]
Organization for the achievement of, inter alia, “universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion.” . . . Increasingly, the Charter
provisions have been linked to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights . . . almost all states would agree that some
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What Is A “Scientific Work” Protected Under
Law?

The U.S.A. is bound as a party to The Berne Copyright
Convention (absent Article 6 bis moral rights), the Uniform
Copyright Convention (UCC), the World Trade Organization
(WTO, and thereby of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights or TRIPS), and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Performance and Phonograms Treaty
(WPPT).384
[T]he Berne Convention refers to “every
production in the . . . scientific domain” and
“works relative to . . .science” (Article 2(1)). The
UCC refers in its preamble and Article I to
“protection of . . . scientific . . . works”. In these
contexts the term scientific refers to works in the
field of science (e.g. the physical or mathematical
sciences) to make it clear that works that do not
have a purely artistic appeal can be covered.385
Berne copyright extends protection to: “all countries of the
Union. This protection shall operate for the benefit of the
author and his successors in title.” 386
infringements of human rights enumerated in the
Declaration are violations of the Charter or of customary
international law . . . . The United Nations Charter and
Charter of the Organization of American States, both of
which include human rights provisions are treaties of the
United States.
Id. (alteration in original).
384. STERLING, supra note 26, at 1267.
385. Id. at 1248, 1267 (the Unites States is a member of the following
international treaties: Berne 1989 (Paris); Universal Copyright Convention
(UCC) 1955 (Paris 1972); World Trade Organization (WTO, and, thus, of
TRIPS) 1995; WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 2002).
386. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
art. 2, para. 6, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty doc. no. 99-27 (1986) (as last revised in
Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended Sept. 28, 1979). The U.S. signed and
enacted into U.S. law via the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (Oct. 31, 1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
101 note); see also ALI, supra note 1, at 4 (“Under the Berne Convention,
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B. Remedy: U.S. Accords Non-Waivable Moral Rights:
Attribution, Integrity, Retraction, and Disclosure to
Research Scientists, with Economic Rights Shared
Equitably with Employers
1.

Is Constitutional: Promotes Rights Guaranteed
Scientists for the Public Benefit

Were the United States to adopt dualist or French theory
of droit moral, this would cause minimal disruption of existing
copyright and associated law.387 The United States already
recognizes separation of economic rights from the actual
author-creator.388 Therefore, to separately recognize in federal
law non-economic rights: attribution, integrity, retraction, and
disclosure, for research scientists, would merely serve to
harmonize these same rights operating de facto at the
institutional and professional association level.389 As discussed,
there appears to be no Constitutional bar, but rather on its face
and by evidence from the Founding Fathers, supported by
recent Supreme Court decisions, remains consistent with
copyright and patent law.390
2.

Harmonizes U.S. Policy with Global IP Policies to
Facilitate U.S. Scientists’ Unfettered Research
Collaboration in Modern Virtual Global Scientific
Research Ventures in the Public Interest

As discussed herein, research scientists today face
monumental challenges, challenges that are administrative
and legal rather than primarily scientific.391 Policies and
procedures governing intellectual property and professional
copyrights arise simultaneously in all 163 (as of December 2007) member
States [nation-states]. Furthermore, trademark and patent rights holder are
increasingly relying on central prosecution of their applications through the
Madrid Protocol, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and the European
Patent Convention (EPC).”).
387. See supra Part IV A.1.a.
388. Id.
389. See supra Part II.
390. See supra Part IV; see also Fisk, supra note 33, at 1128.
391. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 1; Phillips & Ryan, supra note 1.
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ethics standards, historically uniform among research science
institutions today vary dramatically, causing uncertainty
absent uniform federal law.392 The adoption of Berne’s 6bis
droit moral, particularly the French dualist theory, would fix in
law professional ethics standards on which research relies in
fact to maintain research quality and ensure procedural
integrity.393 The adoption of droit moral would also serve to
harmonize United States intellectual property law of more
than 157 countries worldwide, facilitating U.S.-global science
research collaboration.394
V. Conclusion
Modern research science faces new challenges with the
shift from national to global research efforts, funding, and legal
jurisdiction problems inherent to scientific work products
developed multi-nationally.395 Current United States law and
policy, which denies fundamental non-economic moral rights to
research scientists—rights recognized in 157 nations
overseas—has become an overwhelming disincentive to engage
in scientific research in the U.S. Historic research science
ethics standards, promulgated and enforced to ensure scientific
research quality and professional accountability, of both
research practice and reporting by the local institution or
professional societies, have decreasing control of global
research networks.396 As the American Law Institute aptly
describes for new world intellectual property, relevant
principles of law must be harmonized among jurisdictions,
between and among nation-states, for the scientific research
benefits to accrue efficiently to the public’s benefit.397 To that
end, it is urged that the United States adopt intellectual
property moral rights recognition for research science. The
rejection, thereof, is increasingly isolating our nation, and
hence our scientific professional community, from the
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
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See supra Part IV.
Id.
See ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103.
See supra Part II.A-B.
See ALI, supra note 1, at 3-7, §§ 101-103.
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mainstream global research community and to America’s
innovative- and economic profound detriment.398

398. See, e.g., KWALL, supra note 30, at 37.
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